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Abstract:	  
This	  report	  compares	  policy	  learning	  processes	  in	  11	  European	  countries.	  Based	  on	  the	  country	  
reports	  that	  were	  produced	  by	  the	  national	  teams	  of	  the	  INSPIRES	  project	  (www.inspires-­‐
research.eu),	  this	  paper	  develops	  an	  argument	  that	  connects	  problem	  pressure	  and	  politicization	  to	  
learning	  in	  different	  labor	  market	  innovations.	  In	  short,	  we	  argue	  that	  learning	  efforts	  are	  most	  
likely	  to	  impact	  on	  policy	  change	  if	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  problem	  pressure	  that	  clearly	  necessitates	  
political	  action.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  problem	  pressure	  is	  very	  low,	  or	  so	  high	  that	  governments	  
need	  to	  react	  immediately,	  chances	  are	  low	  that	  learning	  impacts	  on	  policy	  change.	  The	  second	  part	  
of	  our	  argument	  contends	  that	  learning	  impacts	  on	  policy	  change	  especially	  if	  a	  problem	  is	  not	  very	  
politicized,	  i.e.	  there	  are	  no	  main	  conflicts	  concerning	  a	  reform,	  because	  then,	  solutions	  are	  wound	  
up	  in	  the	  search	  for	  a	  compromise.	  Our	  results	  confirm	  our	  first	  hypothesis	  regarding	  the	  connection	  
between	  problem	  pressure	  and	  policy	  learning.	  Governments	  learn	  indeed	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  
problem	  pressure.	  However,	  once	  political	  action	  becomes	  really	  urgent,	  i.e.	  in	  anti-­‐crisis	  policies,	  
there	  is	  no	  time	  and	  room	  for	  learning.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  learning	  occurred	  independently	  from	  
the	  politicization	  of	  problem.	  In	  fact,	  in	  countries	  that	  have	  a	  consensual	  political	  system,	  learning	  
occurred	  before	  the	  decision	  on	  a	  reform,	  whereas	  in	  majoritarian	  systems,	  learning	  happened	  after	  
the	  adoption	  of	  a	  policy	  during	  the	  process	  of	  implementation.	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This	   report	   compares	   policy	   learning	   in	   11	   European	   countries.	   Specifically,	   we	   are	  connecting	   problem	   pressures	   and	   the	   politicisation	   of	   a	   given	   problem	   to	   policy	  learning	   and	   policy	   changes	   in	   different	   European	   countries	   and	   different	   clusters	   of	  social	  and	  labour	  market	  policies.	  This	  report	  is	  a	  synthesis	  of	  11	  country	  studies,	  which	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  INSPIRES	  research	  project,	  which	  is	  funded	  under	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  7th	  Framework	  Program.	  The	  project	  compares	  reforms	  of	  labour	  market	  and	  social	  policies	  in	  the	  following	  countries:	  Belgium,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  Hungary,	  Italy,	  Netherlands,	  Slovenia,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland	  and	  the	  UK.	  	  
In	   this	   report,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   focus	   on	   policy	   learning.	   For	   each	   of	   the	   mentioned	  countries,	  a	  national	  team	  of	  experts	  drafted	  a	  country	  report,	  which	  examines	  a	  number	  of	   selected	   innovations	   in	  different	   areas	  of	   social	   and	   labour	  market	  policies	   and	   the	  role	   that	   policy	   learning	   played	   therein.	   The	   selection	   of	   innovations	   is	   based	   on	   the	  efforts	  of	  prior	  working	  packages,	  in	  which	  the	  same	  experts	  examined	  overall	  trends	  in	  social	   and	   labour	  market	   policies	   in	   the	  mentioned	   countries	   during	   the	   period	   from	  2000	   –	   2013	   and	   grouped	   them	   into	   six	   clusters,	   namely	   youth	   unemployment,	   older	  workers	   and	   extension	   of	   working	   life,	   disabled	   persons,	   governance,	   activation	   and	  flexibility	  and	  flexicurity.	  Based	  on	  this	  overview	  of	  labour	  market	  reforms,	  the	  national	  expert	   teams	   selected	   innovations	   and	   analysed	   their	   origin,	   implementation	   and	   the	  role	   of	   policy	   learning	   therein.	   This	   report,	   synthesizes	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   national	  expert	   reports	   and	   attempts	   a	   basic	   analysis	   of	   the	   dynamics	   that	   impede	   or	   favour	  policy	  learning	  being	  important	  for	  reforms.	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In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  we	  are	  going	  proceed	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  we	  will	  define	  policy	  learning	  and	  discuss	  its	  relation	  to	  policy	  change.	  Then,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  introduce	  to	  further	  elements	  that	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  to	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  policy	  learning	  on	  reforms.	  These	  are	  economic	  and	  political	  problems	  pressures,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   politicization	   of	   a	   problem.	   After	   that,	   we	   will	   present	   the	   results	   of	   the	  comparison	  between	  the	  11	  country	  reports	  and	  analyse	  constellations,	  in	  which	  policy	  learning	  played	  an	  important	  role	  for	  policy	  change	  and	  when	  not.	  Conclusions	  follow.	  Learning	  and	  change	  The	  main	  interest	  of	  this	  report	  is	  in	  policy	  learning	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  it	  has	  an	   impact	  on	  policy	  change.	  Policy	   learning	  has	  been	  an	   important	  element	  of	   the	  analysis	   of	   public	   policies	   for	   a	   long	   time.	   In	   his	   presentation	  of	   the	   famous	   advocacy	  coalition	   concept,	   Paul	   Sabatier	   refers	   to	   learning	   as	  part	   of	   “…the	  broader	  process	  of	  policy	   changes	   by	   analysing	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   elites	   from	   different	   advocacy	  coalitions	  gradually	   alter	   their	  belief	   systems	  over	   time,	  partially	   as	   a	   result	  of	   formal	  policy	   analysis	   and	   trial	   and	  error	   learning”	   (Sabatier	  1988:	  130).	  Already	  before,	   but	  especially	  after,	  learning	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  analyses	  and	  been	  subject	  to	   different	   strands	   of	   research,	   which	   we	   have	   reviewed	   for	   the	   project	   in	   another	  report	  (Trein	  2015).	  
Learning	  is	  mostly	  associated	  with	  policy	  change.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  seminal	  article	  on	  policy	   paradigms,	   Peter	   Hall	   put	   forward	   three	   forms	   of	   policy	   change:	   First	   order	  changes,	  which	  entail	  the	  adaptation	  of	  existing	  instruments,	  second	  order	  changes	  that	  entail	   the	   adaptation	   of	   new	   policy	   instruments	   and	   third	   order	   changes,	   which	  comprise	   of	   a	   change	   in	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   policy	   instruments.	   Thereby,	   third	   order	  changes	   are	   similar	   to	   changes	   of	   the	   policy	   paradigm	   (Hall	   1993:	   278),	  which	   is	   the	  basic	   framework	   of	   ideas	   and	   standards	   according	   to	   which	   a	   social	   problem	   is	  interpreted	   and	   the	   policy	   made	   (Hall	   1993:	   279).	   More	   recent	   application	   of	   the	  framework	   have	   distinguished	   a	   fourth	   order	   change,	   which	   solely	   focuses	   on	   the	  adaptation	  of	   overarching	   ideas,	  whereas	   changes	   in	   the	  hierarchy	  of	   instruments	   are	  considered	   as	   third	   order	   changes	   (Falkner,	   2015).	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   change	   is	  present	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  has	  been	  learning	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  innovative	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  solve	  a	  problem	  played	  an	  important	  role	  for	  formulating	  the	  contents	  of	  policy	  change.	   It	   could	   also	   be	   the	   case	   that	   actors	   only	   adapted	   a	   policy	   according	   to	   their	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electoral	   interests,	   or	   that	   there	   they	   learn	   politically	   only,	   namely	   to	   adapt	   their	  strategies	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  public	  benefit.	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  report,	  we	  need	  to	  clarify	  what	  we	  mean	  with	  learning.	  Although	  the	  literature	  on	  policy	  learning	  is	  vast,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  made	   with	   regard	   to	   learning.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   there	   is	   organizational	   and	   political	  learning.	  These	  concepts	  refer	  to	  the	  update	  of	  beliefs	  of	  individual	  or	  collective	  actors	  based	  on	  new	  ideas	  or	  a	  certain	  problem	  pressure,	  but	  with	  their	  own	  interest	  in	  mind.	  In	  other	  words,	  learning	  means	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  strategy	  to	  remain	  in	  power	  or	  to	  retain	  political	  influence,	  also	  known	  as	  “powering”	  (Heclo	  1974).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  policy	   learning	   literatures	   refers	   to	   the	   uptake	   of	   new	   ideas,	   such	   as	   scientific	  innovations	  with	   the	  goal	   to	  solve	  a	  problem	  (Daviter	  2015).	   In	  other	  words,	   it	  means	  the	  infusion	  of	  new	  ideas	  into	  policies	  that	  focus	  on	  solving	  a	  certain	  problem.	  This	  way	  of	  learning	  can	  occur	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways:	  
1. Firstly,	  evidence	  for	  new	  policies	  can	  be	  generated	  from	  research	  that	  has	  been	  undertaken	  abroad	  or	  domestically.	  Such	  research	  can	  for	  example	  take	  the	  form	  of	  pilot	  programs,	  experiments	  or	  simple	  statistical	  simulations.	  2. Secondly,	   learning	   can	   take	   the	   form	   of	   updating	   beliefs	   based	   on	   policy	  experience	  in	  other	  countries	  or	  at	  home.	  For	  example	  policies	  in	  the	  same	  field	  that	  were	  implemented	  abroad	  or	  experiences	  of	  similar	  instruments	  in	  different	  policies	  domestically.	  Other	  than	  conducting	  research	  before	  putting	  a	  policy	  into	  place,	   this	  way	  of	   learning	   is	  based	  on	   trial	   and	  error	  principle,	  which	   can	  –	   at	  times	  –	  have	  significant	  social	  and	  economic	  consequences.	  3. Thirdly,	   learning	   can	   occur	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   international	  actors,	   such	   as	   the	   EU.	   In	   the	   European	   case,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   binding	  guidelines	   and	   processes	   aiming	   to	   foster	   policy	   learning	   amongst	   member	  states.	  However,	  due	   to	  possible	   financial	   returns	   that	  might	  be	  attached	   to	   the	  compliance	  with	   these	   procedures	  make	   it	   different	   to	   judge	   the	   line	   between	  voluntary	  learning	  and	  the	  compliance	  with	  rules.	  
In	  this	  report,	  we	  aim	  to	  make	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  knowledge	  based	  learning	  on	  the	   one	   hand,	   and	   learning	   processes	   that	   have	   been	   induced	   by	   political	   interests.	  When	   referring	   to	   learning,	  we	   adhere	   to	   the	   former	   of	   these	   two.	  Of	   course,	  we	   also	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account	   for	   politically	   induced	   learning	   processes	   (Daviter	   2015:	   499).	   However,	   we	  regard	  them	  as	  an	  intermediary	  variable	  that	  impacts	  on	  how	  knowledge	  based	  learning	  leads	  to	  change.	  This	  definition	  of	  learning	  lends	  itself	  very	  much	  on	  academic	  work	  an	  idealized	  version	  of	  knowledge	  production,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  systematic	  research	  and	  the	  generation	  of	  substantive	  evidence	  for	  an	  intervention	  regarding	  a	  specific	  problem.	  Conducting	   research	   needs	   resources,	   and	   above	   all	   time	   as	  well	   as	   stable	   contextual	  conditions,	   for	   example	   to	   carry	   out	   pilot	   projects	   or	   experiments	   for	   labour	   market	  reforms.	  	  
The	   environment	   of	   everyday	   politics	   does	   not	   necessarily	   provide	   these	   conditions:	  Often,	  policies	  change	  without	  learning	  that	  is	  based	  on	  substantive	  evidence	  playing	  a	  role.	  In	  order	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  learning	  on	  policy	  change,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	   that	   there	   are	   differences	   between	   policy	   learning	   and	   change.	  Whereas	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   imagine	  policy	   learning	  without	   any	   change,	   changes	   in	  public	   policies	   can	  come	   along	   without	   learning.	   In	   fact,	   policy	   learning	   is	   neither	   a	   sufficient	   nor	   a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  policy	  change.	  There	  are	  other	  factors	  that	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration;	   most	   notably	   these	   are	   problem	   pressure	   and	   the	   politicization	   of	   a	  problem.	   In	   the	   following	   sections,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   discuss	   how	   these	   two	   elements	  potentially	  influence	  policy	  learning	  and	  condition	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  change	  of	  policies.	  Problem	  pressure	  and	  politicisation	  Although	   the	   political	   science	   literature	   has	   emphasized	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  connection	   between	   learning	   and	   change,	   policies	   can	   change	   due	   to	   high	   problem	  pressure	   without	   an	   actual	   learning	   happening,	   such	   as	   in	   times	   of	   crisis	   when	  politicians	  need	  to	  find	  quick	  solutions	  to	  urgent	  problems.	  Another	  problem	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  learning	  is	  the	  politicisation	  of	  issues.	  This	  can	  either	  lead	  to	  policy	  change	  without	  a	  high	  problem	  pressure	  being	  present,	   for	   example	  when	  politicians	  want	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   they	   “do	   something”.	   Doing	   nothing	   would	   be	   the	   worst	   option	  possible	  (Bonoli	  2012).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  implementation	  of	  innovative	  ideas	  into	  new	   policies	   might	   be	   impeded	   due	   to	   electoral	   interests,	   special	   interest	   politics	   or	  simple	  institutional	  inertia.	  Problem	  pressure	  Problems	   are	   an	   important	   element	   to	   trigger	   any	   learning	   process,	   because	   they	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stimulate	   interests	   in	   topics.	   From	  policy-­‐makers’	   point	   of	   view,	   an	   issue	   needs	   to	   be	  problematic	  in	  order	  to	  be	  of	  common	  interest	  and	  demand	  regulative	  or	  redistributive	  action.	   Therefore,	   a	   certain	   socio-­‐economic	   problem	   pressure	   should	   be	   present,	   in	  order	  to	  stimulate	  a	  learning	  process	  regarding	  a	  certain	  policy,	  such	  as	  social	  policy	  or	  educational	  policy	  for	  example	  (Hall	  1993).	  Regarding	  labour	  market	  and	  social	  policies	  in	   the	   EU,	   a	   number	   of	   problem	   pressures	   appeared	   that	   should	   trigger	   learning	  processes.	  Firstly,	  the	  demographic	  development	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  problem	  pressure	  on	   pension	   systems.	   Aging	   populations,	   lower	   birth	   rates	   and	   longer	   life	   expectancy	  have	  necessitated	  to	  reform	  pension	  systems,	  i.e.	  by	  reducing	  the	  possibilities	  for	  early	  retirement	   and	   to	   increase	   the	   retirement	   age	   in	   general.	   Secondly,	   in	   some	   countries	  unemployment	   rates	  are	  higher	   than	   in	  others,	   especially	  youth	  unemployment	  varies	  greatly	  between	   the	  European	  economies.	  Thirdly,	   economic	  and	   fiscal	  dynamics	  have	  put	   pressure	   on	   policymakers.	   Since	   the	   1990s,	   many	   OECD	   countries	   with	   mature	  welfare	   states	   have	   entered	   a	   period	  of	   budget	   consolidation,	  which	  puts	  pressure	   on	  government	   finances	   to	   further	   adapt	   social	   policies	   (Wagschal	   and	   Wenzelburger	  2008).	  The	  economic	  and	   financial	   crisis	  after	  2008	  has	  aggravated	   this	  problem	  even	  more	  and	  increased	  fiscal	  pressures	  on	  the	  welfare	  state.	  
Then,	   European	   countries	   face	   a	   number	   of	   political	   pressures	   that	   possibly	   affect	  learning	   and	   policy	   change.	   Notably,	   there	   is	   the	   common	   fiscal	   policy,	   notably	   the	  Maastricht	   treaties,	  which	   created	  debt	   and	  deficit	   limits	   for	  EU	  members.	  During	   the	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis,	  these	  regulations	  have	  been	  tightened	  again,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	   ongoing	   crisis	   of	   the	   European	   economy.	   Notably,	   these	   regulations	   put	   some	  pressures	  on	   labour	  market	   and	   social	   policies,	   because	   they	  diminish	   the	   leverage	  of	  social	  policies	  even	  more,	  particularly	  when	   it	  comes	   to	  spending.	  Whereas	  before	   the	  crisis	   many	   states,	   notably	   France	   and	   Germany,	   implemented	   the	   fiscal	   rules	   of	   the	  Maastricht	   treaties	   not	   strict	   enough,	   this	   has	   become	   more	   difficult	   now.	   More	  importantly,	   the	   creation	  of	   the	  Euro	   and	   the	   transfer	   of	  monetary	   sovereignty	   to	   the	  European	   Central	   Bank	   by	   19	   EU-­‐members	   have	   taken	   away	   the	   possibility	   to	  autonomously	   adjust	   to	   economic	   problem	   pressures	   using	   instruments	   of	   monetary	  policy.	  Consequently,	  governments	  of	  Euro-­‐states	  need	  to	  adjust	  internally	  (as	  opposed	  to	   external,	   monetary	   adjustment)	   to	   economic	   and	   fiscal	   problem	   pressure	   (Walter	  forthcoming),	  which	   impacts	  on	   the	   capacity	   to	   learn	  as	  well	   as	   the	  options	   for	  policy	  change	  that	  are	  available.	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However,	   there	  are	  also	  softer	   incentives	   to	  policy	   learning	   in	   the	  EU,	  namely	   through	  the	   instruments	   that	   are	   based	   on	   the	   OMC	   (Open	   Method	   of	   Coordination).	   This	  instruments	   entails	   mutual	   review	   of	   policies	   in	   the	   member	   states	   and	   aims	   at	  stimulating	   mutual	   learning	   between	   EU	  members	   by	   peer-­‐reviews,	   benchmarks	   and	  other	  indicators	  that	  allow	  to	  compare	  the	  countries’	  solutions	  to	  employment	  and	  other	  social	  problems.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  instrument	  is	  not	  to	  coordinate	  policies	  in	  the	  sense	  to	  reach	   agreements	   and	   common	   commitments,	   but	   it	   aims	   at	   policy	   adjustment	   by	  learning	  from	  other	  countries	  rather	  than	  enforceable	  agreements	  to	  one	  another	  or	  the	  European	  principle	   (Zeitlin	  et	  al.	  2005).	  Financial	   incentives	  at	   the	  EU	   level	   come	   into	  play	   rather	   indirectly,	   for	   example	   through	   projects	   that	   are	   funded	   by	   the	   European	  Social	  Fund	  (ESF).	  
The	  relationship	  between	  problem	  pressure	  and	  learning,	  we	  argue,	  goes	   in	  two	  ways.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  certain	  problem	  pressure	  needs	  to	  be	  present	  in	  order	  for	  learning	  to	  take	  place.	  If	  everything	  works	  well,	  why	  should	  there	  be	  a	  search	  for	  better	  solutions,	  unless	   it	   is	   for	   political	   reasons?	   However,	   learning	   takes	   time,	   especially	   if	   it	   is	  considered	   as	   learning	   in	   an	   academic	   sense.	   To	   create	   substantive	   evidence	   on	  alternative	   solutions	   needs	   patience,	   resources	   and	   somehow	   stable	   conditions.	  However,	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  political	  environments	  might	  change	  quickly	  and	  there	  could	   be	   no	   more	   time	   for	   learning.	   For	   example,	   in	   times	   of	   political	   and	   economic	  crises,	   solutions	   need	   to	   be	   found,	   but	   often	   there	   is	   no	   time	   to	   learn	   based	   on	  substantive	  evidence.	  In	  these	  cases,	  policy	  change	  occurs	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  trial	  and	  error	  and	   decision	   makers	   tend	   to	   rely	   on	   cognitive	   shortcuts,	   such	   as	   big	   countries	   or	  ideologically	   similar	   governments.	   Consequently,	   too	   high	   problem	   pressure	   should	  reduce	  the	  effect	  of	  policy	   learning	  on	  formulating	   institutions,	  at	   least	   in	   its	  academic	  sense	   and	   learning	   becomes	   a	   trial	   and	   error	   game	   in	   reality,	   with	   potentially	   far-­‐reaching	  economic	  and	  social	  consequences.	  Politicisation	  The	   politicisation	   of	   problems	   and	   solutions	   is	   the	   second	   element	   that	   we	   need	   to	  consider	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   impact	   of	   policy	   learning	   on	   change.	   Other	   than	  originating	   in	   evidence-­‐based	   ideas	   for	   better	   solutions,	   policymakers	   might	   adapt	  policies	  due	  to	  political	  interests	  (Boswell	  2009;	  Goldstein	  and	  Keohane	  1993).	  Thereby,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  policymakers	  suggest	  and	  implement	  new	  policies,	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claiming	   that	   they	   are	   “new”	   and	   “better”	   without	   this	   being	   substantially	   proven	   by	  independent	   evidence.	  Often,	   this	   is	   not	   possible	   or	   not	   feasible,	   due	   to	   constraints	   of	  time	  and	  resources.	  However,	   even	   if	   there	   is	   some	  substantive	  evidence	  available	   for	  better	   solutions,	   or	   could	   be	   produced	   with	   reasonable	   time	   and	   resources,	   reforms	  might	   be	   implemented	   anyway	  without	   learning	   –	   or	   innovative	   ideas	  might	   be	   used	  differently	   than	   intended,	   or	   only	   implemented	   partially	   for	   political	   reasons.	   It	   is	  important	   to	   consider	   this	   politicization	   of	   problems	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   policy	  change.	  (Daviter	  2015,	  499)	  
However,	   how	   might	   the	   politicisation	   of	   problems	   impact	   on	   policy	   change?	  Politicisation	  means	  that	  a	  problem	  is	  subject	  to	  political	  contestation,	  mostly	  between	  stakeholders,	  such	  as	   interest	  groups,	  political	  parties	  or	   the	  bureaucracy.	  Rather	  than	  changing	   a	   policy	   according	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   provides	   the	   “best”	   or	   “most	   promising”	  solution	   for	   the	   public	   good,	   decision-­‐makers	   seek	   to	   find	   a	   solution	   that	   best	   serves	  their	   electoral	   interests.	   In	   case	   of	   social	   policies,	   this	   can	   be	   to	   not	   cut	   benefits	   for	  example	   when	   necessary.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   might	   also	   entail	   symbolic	   action,	   by	  implementing	  reforms	  that	  are	  not	  necessary,	  or	  by	  choosing	  solutions	  that	  are	  based	  on	  ideology	   rather	   than	   research.	   For	   example,	   left	   parties	   would	   tend	   to	   favour	  redistributive	  policies,	  because	  they	  are	  convinced	  that	  this	  is	  the	  best	  idea,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  evidence	  suggesting	  a	  better	  solution.	  Of	  course,	  such	  a	  strategy	  is	  closely	  intertwined	  with	  party’s	  electoral	  interests	  (Armingeon	  2012).	  
In	   this	   context,	   institutions	   are	   important,	   because	   in	   some	   countries,	   the	   political	  system	  requires	  finding	  a	  consensus	  amongst	  different	  actors,	   i.e.	   interest	  groups	  need	  being	  heard	   formally,	   there	   are	   two	  parliamentary	   chambers	   or	   there	   is	   a	   very	   active	  constitutional	  court.	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  would	  expect	  that	  learning	  take	  a	  secondary	  role	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  decisions,	  because	  there	  are	  many	  interests	  that	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  However,	   this	   does	   not	   necessarily	   need	   to	   happen.	   There	  might	   be	   learning	  based	   policy	   change,	   despite	   many	   institutional	   veto	   points.	   In	   such	   a	   case	   only	   the	  likelihood	   increases	   considerably	   that	   a	   problem	   will	   be	   politicised.	   However,	   the	  literature	   on	   institutional	   change	   in	   social	   policies	   has	   shown	   that	   governments	   learn	  above	   all	   politically,	   because	   they	   try	   to	   adopt	   policies	   in	   a	   way	   that	   protects	   their	  electoral	  interests	  (Hacker	  2005;	  Pierson	  1994).	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Regarding	   social	   and	   labour	   market	   policies,	   there	   are	   three	   ways	   in	   which	   policies	  might	  be	  politicized:	  
1. The	  first	  one	  is	  the	  partisan	  arena.	  Left	  and	  right	  parties	  ought	  to	  have	  different	  opinions	   on	   reforming	   social	   policies,	   which	   might	   impact	   on	   the	   influence	   of	  evidence	   and	   learning	   on	   policy	   solutions.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   parties	  might	   in	  general	  agree	  on	  a	  solution,	  i.e.	  left	  and	  right	  parties	  support	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  retirement	  age	  (Schmidt	  1996).	  2. Secondly,	   interest	   groups,	   especially	   social	   partners	   are	   important.	   Generally	  speaking,	   unions	   should	   support	   more	   generous	   social	   policies	   whereas	  employers	   ought	   to	   be	   in	   favour	   of	   less	   regulated	   labour	   markets.	   This	  assumptions	  are	  generally	  known,	  however,	   they	  might	  condition	   the	   impact	  of	  learning	   on	   policy	   change,	   because	   these	   actors	   have	   the	   interest	   to	   influence	  solutions	   in	   their	  proper	   interest.	  What	   is	  more,	   the	   country	   reports	   show	   that	  the	  mentioned	  actors	  have	  their	  own	  research	  centres	   in	  many	  of	   the	  countries	  under	   observation	   in	   this	   report	   and	   might	   therefore	   commission	   their	   own	  research	  and	  evidence	  that	  supports	  their	  point	  of	  view.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  might	  also	  learn	  and	  change	  their	  opinion	  on	  certain	  policy	  aspects.	  Evidently,	  the	  adaptation	   of	   existing	   beliefs	   on	   policies	   is	   more	   likely	   concerning	   secondary	  aspects	   than	   actual	   policy	   beliefs,	   which	   favours	   small,	   but	   no	   big	   changes	   of	  policies	  (Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  1999:	  145).	  3. Thirdly,	  political	  institutions	  can	  shape	  policy	  learning.	  Specifically	  the	  difference	  between	   the	   consensual	   or	   majoritarian	   institutions	   might	   have	   an	   impact	   on	  how	  learning	  happens	  (Hemerijck	  and	  Visser	  2003:	  22).	  Thereby,	  we	  are	  arguing	  that	   in	   consensual	   political	   systems,	   learning	   should	   occur	   before	   a	   reform	   is	  implemented	  whereas	  in	  majoritarian	  institutions	  it	  is	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  consensual	  political	  systems,	   learning	  occurs	  together,	   i.e.	  through	   social	   pacts.	   Then,	  many	  of	   the	  main	   actors	   in	   the	  political	   system,	   i.e.	  parties,	   interest	   groups	   and	   ministries	   bring	   along	   their	   own	   knowledge	   from	  their	  own	  learning	  tools	  and	  processes.1	  Consequently,	  learning	  occurs	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  consensus-­‐building	  process.	  Thereby,	  actors	  need	  to	  be	  convincing,	  which	  is	  why	  they	  might	  need	  to	  present	  well	  researched	  arguments,	  possibly	  ones	  that	  are	   grounded	   on	   policy	   related	   research.	   Contrariwise,	   consensual	   institutions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  We	  discuss	  the	  learning	  tools	  and	  processes	  of	  each	  country	  in	  D5.4.	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could	  dilute	  a	  preformed	  solution	   through	  excessive	  politicisation	  of	  a	  problem	  and	  consensus	  formation.	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  solution	  might	  be	  politically	  feasible,	  but	  not	  very	  effective,	  or	  even	  detrimental,	  from	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  approach.	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   in	   majoritarian	   political	   systems	   government	   can	   decide	   alone.	  Therefore,	   learning	   might	   occur	   after	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   reform,	   mostly	  during	  the	  evaluation	  process.	  	  
To	   sum	   up,	   in	   this	   section	   we	   discussed	   possible	   elements	   that	   might	   stimulate	   and	  impede	  the	   impact	  of	  policy	   learning	  on	  policy	  changes.	  We	  have	  argued	  that	  problem	  pressure,	  either	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  or	  political	  origin,	  might	  impact	  on	  whether	  learning	  takes	  place	  and	  how	  it	  influences	  policy	  change.	  Particularly,	  we	  put	  forward	  the	  points	  that	   there	  needs	   to	  be	  some	  problem	  pressure	   in	  order	   to	  stimulate	   learning,	  but	   that	  too	  high	  problem	  pressure	   impedes	   the	   impact	   of	   learning	  on	   the	   changes	  of	   policies,	  because	   then	   there	   is	  no	   time	   to	   implement	   the	   “best”	   solution	   for	   the	   common	  good.	  What	  is	  more,	  we	  held	  that	  party	  differences	  and	  interest	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  consensual	  institutions	  impact	  on	  how	  of	  learning	  affects	  policy	  change.	  Results:	  Learning	  and	  policy	  change	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  analyse	  the	  impact	  of	  policy	  learning,	  problem	  pressures	   and	   issue	   politicisation	   on	   labour	   market	   and	   social	   policy	   reforms	   in	   11	  European	  countries.	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  the	  empirical	  basis	  for	  these	  reports	  are	  the	  country	   reports	   on	   labour	   market	   and	   social	   policy	   innovations	   that	   national	   expert	  teams	   conducted.	   Each	   team	  was	   provided	  with	   a	   template	   that	   contained	   guidelines	  regarding	   the	   information	   that	   needed	   to	   be	   collected	   for	   the	   reports.	   Each	   of	   the	  country	  teams	  analysed	  learning	  in	  three	  innovations	  from	  different	  clusters	  that	  were	  selected	  from	  a	  large	  overview	  of	  reforms.	  
In	   the	   following,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   discuss	   the	   comparative	   results	   in	   three	   sections.	  Firstly,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   evaluate	   how	   problem	   pressure	   induced	   learning	   and	   give	  examples	   from	   the	   case	   studies	   that	   show	   under	   which	   conditions	   problem	   pressure	  sparked	   learning	   processes	   by	   politicians	   and	   governments.	   In	   the	   second	   part	   of	   the	  first	   subsection,	  we	  are	  going	   to	  outline	  under	  which	  circumstances	  problem	  pressure	  leads	   to	  policy	  change,	  but	  without	   involving	   learning	  processes.	   In	   the	  second	  part	  of	  this	   report,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   explain	   how	   learning	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   agenda	   setting	   and	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decision-­‐making	  of	  labour	  market	  and	  social	  policies.	  In	  the	  third	  section,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  outline	  how	  the	  politicisation	  of	  problems	  impedes	  that	  learning	  effects	  influence	  on	  solutions	   and	  how	  political	   agenda’s	   impacted	  policy	   change	   rather	   than	   learning	   and	  problem	   solving.	   A	   systematic	   overview	   of	   all	   innovations	   and	   the	   learning	   that	   was	  attached	  to	  them	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  annex	  of	  this	  report.	  Problem	  pressure	  and	  learning	  The	  relation	  between	  policy	  learning	  and	  problem	  pressure	  can	  take	  two	  forms.	  Firstly,	  problem	   pressure	   can	   ignite	   policy	   learning,	   because	   there	   needs	   to	   be	   some	   sort	   of	  unsolved	  issue	  that	   is	  relevant	   for	  policymakers	  and	  that	  needs	  addressing	   in	  order	  to	  improve	   the	   common	   good.	   Secondly,	   problem	   pressure	   can	   also	   be	   problematic	   for	  policy	  learning,	  especially	  when	  it	  is	  very	  high,	  for	  example	  when	  the	  economic	  situation	  necessitates	   immediate	   reaction	   by	   policymakers	   and	   there	   is	   no	   time	   to	   seek	   and	  evaluate	  the	  best	  solution	  before	  implementing	  a	  major	  reform.	  
Problem	  pressure	  can	  be	  conducive	  to	  learning	  The	   first	   result	   that	   we	   can	   retrieve	   from	   the	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   the	   country	  reports	  of	  work	  package	  five	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  between	  problem	  pressure	  and	  learning,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   changes	   in	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   or	   political	   environment	  triggered	   learning	   processes	   of	   policymakers	   and	   stakeholders	   that	   searched	   for	   new	  solutions	   to	   problems,	   taking	   into	   account	   evidence	   that	   is	   for	   example	   based	   on	  statistical	  analysis,	  pilot	  projects	  or	  independent	  expertise.	  
This	  connection	  between	  problem	  pressure	  and	  learning	  can	  be	  found	  particularly	  with	  regard	   to	   the	   reform	   of	   pension	   systems	   in	   European	   countries.	   For	   example,	   in	  Germany,	   interest	  groups,	  political	  parties	  and	  members	  of	  the	  administration	  realized	  already	  in	  the	  1990s	  that	  the	  German	  “culture	  of	  early	  retirement”	  needs	  to	  be	  reformed	  in	   order	   to	   keep	   the	  pension	   system	   sustainable.	   Consequently,	   a	   search	   for	   solutions	  began,	  which	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  adaptations	  of	  the	  pension	  system.	  Similarly	  so	   in	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  in	  Belgium.	  Dutch	  governments	  began	  to	  understand	  during	  the	  1990s,	  that	  the	  country’s	  pension	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  changed,	  however	  it	  took	  until	  2008	  for	  the	  governments	  to	  start	  a	  reform	  process.	  Belgium	  is	  another	  example,	  where	  increasing	   problem	   pressure,	   i.e.	   aging	   population,	   triggered	   a	   learning	   process.	  Interestingly	   however,	   the	   EU	   played	   a	   relatively	   important	   role	   in	   the	   Belgian	   case,	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notably	   through	   its	  Europe	  2020	  strategy,	  which	  set	  a	   target	  employment	   rate	   for	   the	  elderly.	   Following	   the	   suggestions	   by	   the	   EU	   commission,	   the	   Di	   Rupo	   government	  created	   a	   commission	   for	   pension	   reform	   that	   sought	   to	   find	   solutions	   on	   how	   to	  improve	  the	  employability	  of	  pensioners.	  
A	  second	  example	  where	  problem	  pressure	  triggered	  learning	  processes	  are	  in	  the	  area	  of	   minimum	   wages,	   in	   Germany,	   but	   also	   in	   the	   UK.	   In	   Germany,	   the	   coverage	   of	  successfully	   closed	   collective	   bargaining	   agreements	   reduced	   gradually	   since	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   and	   there	  was	   a	   considerable	   difference	   in	  wages	   coverages	   between	   East	   and	  West	  Germany.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  unions	  and	  also	   the	  social	  democratic	  party	  put	   the	  matter	   on	   the	   political	   agenda.	   However,	   before	   the	   reform	   could	   be	   implemented,	   a	  learning	  process	   took	  place,	   as	  we	  will	   explain	   in	   the	   following	   section.	  Regarding	   the	  UK,	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  national	  minimum	  wage	  entered	  the	  national	  political	  agenda	  during	  the	  1980s,	   due	   to	   the	   rising	   insecurities	   on	   the	   labour	  market	   following	   liberalisation	  reforms	   as	   well	   as	   increasing	   globalisation	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   the	   domestic	   labour	  market.	  Yet,	  after	  the	  problem	  had	  been	  put	  on	  the	  political	  agenda,	  learning	  occurred.	  Especially,	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  evaluations	  also	  based	  on	  the	  experience	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  before	  the	  Labour	  party	  put	  the	  problem	  on	  its	  political	  agenda.	  
A	   third	  example	   for	  problem	  pressure	   triggering	  policy	   learning	   is	  youth	  employment,	  which	  became	  obvious	   studying	   innovations	   in	   three	   countries,	   notably	   Italy,	   Sweden,	  and	  Switzerland.	  Beginning	  with	  the	  latter,	  the	  Swiss	  economy	  went	  through	  a	  shortage	  of	   training	   places	   for	   young	   pupils	   in	   the	   1990s,	   which	   triggered	   a	   learning	   and	   the	  assessment	   of	   new	  options	   for	   training	   unemployed	   youth.	   In	   Sweden,	   the	   number	   of	  unemployed	  youth	  increased	  considerably	  following	  the	  2000s.	  This	  problem	  pressure	  caused	   some	   learning	   effects,	   for	   example	   the	   search	   for	   new	   ideas	   abroad.	   In	   that	  context,	  policymakers	  took	  inspiration	  from	  abroad,	  notably	  the	  idea	  regarding	  the	  job	  guarantee	  for	  youth	  program,	  which	  aimed	  at	  training	  young	  unemployed	  and	  to	  place	  them	   in	   jobs	   was	   inspired	   by	   similar	   experiences	   in	   Denmark	   and	   the	   UK.	   Another	  example	  for	  learning	  processes	  that	  followed	  youth	  unemployment	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Italy.	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   main	   problem	   was	   a	   lack	   of	   transfer	   of	   young	   adults	   from	  apprenticeships	   to	   the	   labour	   market,	   which	   lead	   to	   a	   number	   of	   adaptations	   of	   the	  apprenticeship	  program	  for	  young	  adults,	  notably	  in	  2003,	  2011	  and	  2013.	  The	  ideas	  for	  the	   2003	   reform	   were	   taken	   from	   the	   French	   model	   of	   tertiary	   higher	   education,	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whereas	  during	  the	  crisis,	  policymakers	  turned	  to	  Germany	  in	  order	  to	  gather	  ideas	  to	  reform	  the	  Italian	  system	  of	  apprenticeships.	  
Then	   there	   is	   a	   second	   form	   of	   problem	   pressure,	   which	   has	   been	   conducive	   to	  government	   learning,	   in	   the	  sense	   that	  helped	  to	  put	  certain	  problems	  on	  the	  national	  political	  agendas.	  Notably,	  this	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  soft	  political	  pressure	  coming	  out	  of	  EU	  governance,	  notably	  the	  participation	  in	  OMCs.	  For	  example	  the	  Belgian	  pension	  reform,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   youth	   employment	   plan	   was	   incentivized	   not	   only	   by	   the	   problem	  pressures,	   but	   also	   EU	   guidelines.	   Similarly	   in	   Spain,	   the	   EU	   put	   some	   issues	   on	   the	  agenda,	  i.e.	  the	  active	  insertion	  program,	  which	  was	  defined	  following	  EU	  guidelines	  in	  2000	  and	  then	   fully	  established	   in	  2006.	  The	  same	  occurred	  with	  regard	  to	   the	   Italian	  reform	  of	  public	  employment	  services.	  
Too	  high	  problem	  pressure	  impedes	  learning	  efforts	  However,	   problem	  pressure	   does	   not	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   policy	   learning,	   but	   can	   also	  have	  the	  contrary	  effect,	  namely	  to	  impede	  learning	  by	  policy	  makers.	  Notably,	  this	  is	  the	  case	  when	  problems	   are	   very	   pressing,	   for	   example	   unemployment	   rises	   very	   fast,	   or	  debts	   in	  social	   insurances	  are	  too	  high	  and	  immediate	  action	  is	  necessary.	  In	  this	  case,	  policymakers	  want	  to	  implement	  solutions	  quickly	  and	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  less	  impact	  of	   learning.	   The	   intention	   of	   quick	   reactions	   are	   first	   of	   all	   to	   solve	   the	   problem,	   but	  policy	  makers	  want	  also	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  being	  active	  in	  times	  of	  crisis.	  In	  these	  situations,	  there	  is	  little	  time	  for	  learning.	  Consequently,	  the	  door	  is	  open	  for	  politically	  rather,	  or	  even	  “panic	  driven”	  than	  problem-­‐oriented	  solutions.	  
This	  relationship	  between	  problem	  pressure	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  learning	  is	  one	  that	  we	  can	   observe	   during	   the	   global	   financial	   and	   economic	   crisis	   as	  well	   as	   its	   aftermaths.	  Most	  notably	  in	  that	  sense	  are	  the	  examples	  for	  labour	  market	  reforms	  in	  Greece.	  High	  problem	  pressure	   is	  obvious	   in	   the	  Greek	  case,	  notably	  extremely	  high	  unemployment	  rates,	   unsustainable	   debt	   and	   insufficient	   social	   benefits.	   What	   is	   more,	   there	   is	  considerable	  political	  pressure	  from	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  the	  EU	  Commission	  and	  the	   IMF	   to	   adapt	   labour	  market	   and	   social	   policies	   in	   order	   to	  meet	   fiscal	   aims.	   This	  context	   has	   led	   to	   number	   of	   far	   reaching	   reforms.	   Notably,	   these	   adjustments	   were	  temporal	  employment	  for	  public	  benefit,	  which	  provided	  job	  seekers	  with	  a	  temporary	  job	   that	  allowed	   them	  for	  example	   to	  clean	  streets.	  A	  second	  reform	  entails	  a	  voucher	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scheme	  to	  finance	  temporary	  training	  of	  unemployed	  in	  private	  companies	  that	  was	  set	  up	  in	  2011.	  The	  third	  reform	  was	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  full	  retirement	  age,	  which	  entered	  into	   force	   in	  2015.	   In	  all	  of	   these	  reforms,	   learning	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  play	  an	   important	  role,	   although	   the	   contents	   of	   these	   reforms	   had	   been	   put	   on	   the	   agenda	   of	   Greek	  policymakers	  a	  long	  time	  ago,	  either	  by	  recommendations	  from	  the	  EU	  or	  the	  OECD.	  We	  could	  argue	  that	  just	  because	  these	  reforms	  were	  implemented	  during	  the	  crisis,	  policy	  learning	   is	   present.	   However,	   rather	   than	   learning	   from	   convincing	   evidence,	  policymakers	  complied	  with	  the	  “suggestions”	  of	  external	  actors,	  since	  it	  guaranteed	  the	  continuation	  of	  funds	  and	  loans	  to	  be	  paid.	  However,	  these	  policies	  were	  not	  subject	  to	  trials	  or	  other	  evidence-­‐building	  in	  Greece	  itself	  before	  they	  were	  put	  into	  legislation.	  
Spain	   is	   another	   example	   of	   labour	  market	   reforms	   in	   times	   of	   tight	   crisis	   pressures.	  Notably,	   the	   temporary	  assistance	   scheme	   to	   support	   reinsertion	   in	   the	   job	  market	  as	  well	   as	   the	   strategy	   to	   encourage	   entrepreneurship	   and	   self-­‐employment	   for	   young	  unemployed	  is	  examples	  of	  change	  without	  learning.	  Both	  measures	  came	  into	  force	  in	  the	   context	   of	   extremely	   high	   unemployment,	   especially	   youth	   unemployment	   during	  the	  crisis.	  Particularly	  the	  temporary	  assistance	  scheme	  (in	  the	  PREPARA	  programme)	  is	  an	  interesting	  illustration	  of	  policy	  change	  without	  learning,	  because	  decision	  makers	  decided	  to	   implement	   it	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  previous	  similar	  programme	  had	  had	  a	  low	  impact.	  Subsequent	  evaluations	  of	  the	  program	  showed	  that	  it	  had	  a	  weak	  impact	  on	  reinserting	   recipients	   into	   the	   labour	   market.	   The	   strategy	   to	   encourage	  entrepreneurship	   and	   self-­‐employment	   followed	   EU-­‐strategies	   on	   youth	   employment.	  Hungary	  shows	  similar	  dynamics	  during	  the	  crisis,	  when	  the	  government	  implemented	  a	  pathway	   to	  work	  scheme	  (2009)	  and	  a	  new	   labour	  code	  (2011).	  Both	  reforms	  did	  not	  originate	   in	   policy	   learning	   efforts,	   but	   only	   the	   pressure	   of	   the	   crisis	   on	   the	   national	  economy.	   Policy	   learning	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   experiments	   were	   conducted	   or	   the	  experience	  of	  other	  countries	  was	  profoundly	  evaluated	  did	  not	  count	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	   the	  reform.	  For	  example	  regarding	  the	   labour	  code,	  which	  weakened	  the	  Hungarian	  Unions	  even	  further,	  only	  legal	  questions	  were	  important	  for	  the	  government.	  
The	   reports	   show	   also	   instances	   of	   learning	   after	   reforms	   had	   been	   implemented.	   In	  these	   cases,	   governments	   identified	   a	   problem	   pressure,	   implemented	   a	   solution	   and	  evaluated	  and	  adapted	  the	  policies	  after	  that.	  This	  occurred	  for	  example	  in	  Switzerland.	  The	  country’s	  economy	  went	   through	  a	   recession	  during	   the	  early	  1990s,	  which	  came	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along	  with	  a	  reduction	  of	  available	  places	  for	  apprenticeships	  for	  young	  people.	  In	  2002,	  the	   national	   parliament	   adopted	   a	   revision	   of	   the	   existing	   Vocational	   Education	   and	  Training	  law,	  which	  entailed	  amongst	  others	  a	  centralisation	  of	  the	  existing	  regulations	  regarding	  vocational	  training.	  The	  solution	  for	  the	  law	  was	  based	  on	  suggestions	  made	  by	  expert	  commissions,	  however	  there	  were	  no	  pilot	  projects	  etc.	  Learning	  from	  experts	  occurred	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  law,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  an	  evaluation	  in	  2007.	  The	  report	   on	   labour	   market	   reforms	   in	   Sweden	   observed	   a	   similar	   dynamic,	   notably	  regarding	  the	  adaptation	  of	  activity	  compensation	  and	  the	  reform	  of	  youth	  employment	  legislation.	  In	  2007,	  the	  government	  reformed	  eligibility	  for	  activity	  compensation	  from	  19-­‐30	  years,	  but	  eligibility	  conditions	  became	  stricter.	  Notably,	  the	  benefits	  were	  related	  to	  some	  paid	  work	  and	  assessment	  conditions	  became	  tighter.	  Learning	  occurred	  during	  the	  process	   of	   policy	   implementation.	   For	   example,	   in	   2008,	   trials	  with	  private	   actors	  were	   introduced	   and	   in	   2011,	   an	   evaluation	   demonstrated	   that	   although	   application	  rates	   had	   doubled,	   placement	   rates	   remained	   low.	   A	   similar	   structure	   occurred	   with	  regard	  to	  the	  job	  guarantee	  program	  for	  the	  youth,	  which	  was	  created	  in	  2006,	  due	  to	  a	  high	  rate	  of	  unemployed	  youth.	  The	  ideas	  for	  the	  program	  originated	  in	  other	  countries,	  for	  example	   in	  Denmark	  and	   the	  UK.	  However,	   trials	  were	  not	  made,	  but	   the	  program	  was	  evaluated	  after	  implementation.	  
However,	   the	  reports	  reveal	  a	  number	  of	   instances,	   in	  which	  the	  crisis	   impacted	  not	  only	  
negatively	   on	   learning	   efforts	   of	   governments.	   The	   first	   example	   is	   Italy,	   notably	   the	  reform	  of	  the	  Italian	  apprenticeship	  system,	  where	  learning	  occurred	  during	  the	  crisis,	  although	   in	   a	   very	   inconsistent	   way.	   In	   2003,	   the	   Italian	   government	   had	   decided	   to	  adapt	   its	  system	  according	  to	  the	  French	  model	  of	   tertiary	  higher	  education.	  However,	  this	   changed	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   crisis,	   when	   the	   “expert	   government”	   under	   Monti	  implemented	   a	   dual	   apprenticeship	   program	   allowing	   for	   young	   Italians	   to	   apply	   to	  apprenticeships	  in	  Germany.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  government	  undertook	  a	  fact	  finding	  mission	   to	   Germany.	   However,	   these	   efforts	   were	   not	   continued	   under	   the	   Renzi	  government.	  The	  Netherlands	  are	  a	  second	  example	  where	  the	  crisis	  had	  an	  important	  impact	   on	   policy	   change	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   learning	   therein,	   namely	   the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  retirement	  age.	  Since	  the	  1990s,	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  OECD	  had	  suggested	  that	   the	  Dutch	   governments	   need	   to	   increase	   the	   retirement	   age,	   but	   elected	   officials	  had	  not	  dared	  to	  do	  so,	  due	  to	  political	  obstacles.	  After	  2008,	  a	  new	  commission	  (Bakker	  Commission)	   underlined	   again	   the	   necessity	   for	   the	   government	   to	   adapt,	   and	   the	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context	   of	   economic	   insecurity	   and	   higher	   government	   debt	   changed	   public	   opinion.	  Eventually,	  in	  2015,	  retirement	  age	  could	  be	  increased	  from	  65	  to	  67	  years.	  
To	   sum	   up,	   our	   analysis	   shows	   that	   problem	   pressure	   can	   lead	   to	   learning,	   but	   also	  impede	   learning	  processes,	  especially	  when	  the	  context	  necessitates	   immediate	  action.	  In	  order	  to	  stimulate	  learning	  processes	  before	  an	  actual	  reform	  is	  made,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  some	  kind	  of	  problem	  pressure,	  in	  order	  for	  a	  problem	  to	  rise	  onto	  the	  agenda	  and	  to	  trigger	  political	  action.	  This	  can	  be	  socio-­‐economic	  or	  political	  pressures,	  with	  the	  latter	  coming	   for	   example	   from	   the	   EU	   and	   a	   country’s	   participation	   in	  OMCs.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	   if	   problem	  pressure	   is	   high,	   governments	   need	   to	   react	   quickly	   and	   there	   is	   no	  time	  for	  learning.	  This	  dynamic	  became	  especially	  obvious	  during	  the	  crisis	  and	  the	  anti-­‐crisis	  policies	  in	  Southern	  Europe.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  crisis	  also	  created	  windows	  of	  opportunity	   to	   implement	   learning-­‐based	   solutions,	  which	   could	  not	  be	  put	   into	  place	  before,	  due	  to	  unfavourable	  political	  circumstances.	  Forms	  of	  learning	  As	  we	  discussed	   it	   in	   the	  previous	   section,	   learning	   is	  part	  of	   the	   reform	  processes	   in	  European	  labour	  market	  and	  social	  policies,	  however	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  change	  of	  policies	  depends	  on	  problem	  pressure	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  politicization	  of	  a	  certain	  problem.	  So	  far,	  we	  have	  analysed	  how	  and	  why	  problem	  pressure	  was	  positive	  and	  negative	  for	  policy	  learning.	   In	   this	   section,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   outline	   different	   forms	   of	   learning	   that	   we	  found	  in	  the	  country	  report,	  before	  turning	  to	  political	  obstacles	  against	  learning	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
There	   were	   various	   forms	   of	   policy	   learning	   that	   played	   a	   role	   for	   agenda	   setting,	  formulation	  of	  solutions,	  decision	  making	  as	  well	  as	   implementation	  of	  reforms.	   In	  the	  following,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   list	   a	   number	   of	   ways	   in	   which	   policy	   learning	   occurred,	  without	  any	  order	  of	  importance.	  KNOWLEDGE	  REGIMES	  
1. Statistical	  information:	  The	   first	  and	  most	   common	  way	  of	  policy	   learning	   is	  by	  means	  of	  statistical	  information	  and	  modelling	  of	  expected	  future	  developments	  of	   economic	   and	   demographic	   figures.	   In	  many	   of	   the	   country	   reports	   that	  we	  received,	   the	   experts	   report	   that	   learning	   occurred	   by	   means	   of	   statistics,	   for	  example	   information	  about	   labour	  market	  development,	  demographic	  evolution	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and	  data	  on	  public	  finances.	  Based	  on	  these	  information,	  governments	  and	  other	  actors	   use	   simple	   statistical	   analyses	   as	  well	   as	  more	   complicated	   econometric	  modelling	   in	   order	   to	   predict	   future	   developments	   and	   adapt	   existing	   policy	  instruments	  accordingly.	  A	  prominent	  example	  for	  this	  type	  of	  learning	  occurred	  in	  the	  field	  of	  pension	  policy	  and	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  retirement	  age.	  2. Expert	  consultation:	  This	  is	  a	  very	  broad	  category	  of	  learning,	  which	  includes	  all	  kinds	  of	  expert	  involvement	  in	  the	  process	  of	  reforming	  social	  and	  labour	  market	  policies.	   Nowadays,	   consulting	   experts	   has	   become	   a	   standard	   procedure	   in	  public	  policy.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  very	  wide	  variety	  of	  who	  can	  be	  an	  expert,	  and	  more	   importantly	   stakeholders	   with	   political	   interests	   nominate	   their	   own	  experts.	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   question	   the	   background	   of	   expert	  reports	  that	  are	  being	  used	  by	  various	  actors,	  due	  to	  possible	  political	  affiliations.	  Notably,	   expertise	   commissioned	   by	   political	   parties,	   trade	   unions,	   employer	  organisations	  and	  other	  interest	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  government	  itself	  play	  an	  important	   role	   for	   reforms,	  but	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  scrutinize	   them	  for	  a	  possible	  political	  bias.	  Expert	  reports	  that	  were	  put	  forward	  by	  more	  independent	  actors,	  such	  as	  parliamentary	  research	  services	  or	  independent	  experts	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  objective	  than	  research	  that	  has	  been	  explicitly	  commissioned	  by	  a	  political	  stakeholder.	  3. Expert	  commissions:	  Expert	   commissions	  are	  a	   subgroup	  of	  expert	   involvement,	  which	   played	   an	   important	   role,	   notably	   for	   the	   reform	   of	   pension	   systems	   in	  Continental	   European	   welfare	   states.	   Often,	   former	   politicians	   or	   well-­‐known	  experts	   take	   the	   lead	   of	   the	   commission.	   Members	   of	   the	   commissions	   are	  representatives	  of	  the	  most	  important	  political	  parties	  as	  well	  as	  interest	  groups.	  The	   goal	   of	   setting	   up	   these	   commissions	   is	   to	   canalize	   conflicts	   and	   ensure	   a	  combination	   of	   expertise	   and	   political	   negotiation	   regarding	   important	   and	  politicized	   issues,	   such	   as	   pension	   reforms.	   Since	   the	   commissions	   combine	  factional	  expertise	  and	  political	   interests,	  policymakers	  hope	  that	   they	  come	  up	  with	   suggestions	   that	   are	   suitable	   for	   a	   compromise.	   Examples	   for	   these	  commissions	  are	   the	  Süssmuth	  Commission	  and	   the	  Rürup	  Commission	   for	   the	  reform	  of	  the	  German	  pension	  system.	  Examples	  from	  other	  European	  countries	  are	   the	  Bakker	  and	  the	  DeVries	  Commissions	   in	   the	  Netherlands,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  Belgium	  pension	  reform	  commission.	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4. Pilots:	  Pilots	  are	  another	  way	  of	  how	  learning	  can	  occur	  in	  the	  reform	  process.	  In	  this	  case,	  implementation	  of	  a	  reform	  is	  important	  for	  actual	  decision	  making.	  In	  its	  ideal	  form,	  policy	  makers	  set	  up	  a	  number	  of	  pilots	  that	  test	  a	  planned	  reform	  before	  it	  is	  being	  implemented	  nationwide.	  These	  kind	  of	  learning	  instrument	  is	  focused	  on	  application,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  needs	  time	  until	  pilots	  have	  been	  set	  up	  and	  are	  evaluated.	  However,	  in	  the	  everyday	  business	  of	  policymaking,	  time	  is	  scarce	   and	   therefore	  policymakers	  do	  not	  wait	   for	   the	   full	   evaluation	  of	   a	  pilot	  until	   they	  decide	  about	  a	   law,	  or	   implement	   it	  despite	  a	  pilot	  program	  that	  was	  not	   successful.	  The	  country	   reports	  on	  policy	   learning	  report	   that	  governments	  set	  up	  pilots	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  policy	  rather	  than	   to	   decide	   for	   or	   against	   a	   reform.	   For	   example,	   regarding	   the	  implementation	   of	   activity	   compensations	   for	   disabled	   youth,	   the	   Swedish	  government	  conducted	  a	  number	  of	  pilot	  programs.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  experiments	  provided	  some	  insights	  on	  the	   implementation	  of	   the	  participation	  law,	   which	   integrated	   social	   assistance,	   the	   sheltered	   employment	   act	   for	  disabled	  workers	  and	  the	  benefits	  for	  unemployed	  who	  became	  disabled	  before	  they	  had	  turned	  18.	  In	  Switzerland,	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  5th	  revision	  of	  the	  invalidity	   insurance	   improved	   the	   possibility	   for	   private	   providers	   to	   demand	  financing	   for	   pilot	   projects,	   which	   were	   afterwards	   evaluated	   by	   the	   federal	  government.	  5. Learning	   from	   own	   experience:	   Learning	   from	   own	   experience	   means	   that	  governments	  learn	  from	  successful	  or	  unsuccessful	  policies	  in	  their	  own	  country.	  This	   type	  of	   learning	   is	  different	   from	  pilots,	  because	   there	  are	  no	   test	   trials	  or	  experiments,	  but	  policies	  were	  adapted	  since	  they	  did	  not	  fulfil	  their	  purpose	  or	  were	   too	   expensive.	   Usually,	   this	   kind	   of	   learning	   entails	   the	   adaptation	   of	   a	  policy	  after	  an	  evaluation	  project.	  For	  example,	  the	  4th	  and	  the	  5th	  revision	  of	  the	  Swiss	   invalidity	   insurance	   entail	   this	   kind	   of	   learning.	   Such	   learning	   is	   very	  common	   and	   different	   from	   learning	   by	   trials	   or	   experiments	   that	   were	  conducted	   before	   deciding	   or	   implementing	   a	   policy,	   as	   updating	   of	   ideas	  occurred	   after	   a	   policy	   had	   been	   fully	   implemented.	   A	   special	   case	   of	   learning	  from	  own	  experience	  is	  law	  on	  an	  overall	  minimum	  wage,	  in	  Germany.	  Before	  the	  overall	  minimum	  wage,	  which	  was	  decided	  in	  2015,	  found	  the	  support	  of	  the	  two	  main	   parties	   and	   the	   unions,	   existing	   minimum	   wages	   in	   some	   sectors	   were	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evaluated.	   Once	   it	   was	   sufficiently	   researched	   that	   minimum	   wages	   did	   not	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  jobs	  available,	  the	  conservative	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  agreed	  to	  the	  reform.2	  6. Learning	  from	  other	  countries:	  Another	  form	  of	  learning	  focuses	  on	  experiences	  of	  other	  countries.	  This	  way	  of	   learning	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  previous	  point.	  The	  main	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   is	   however	   that	   new	   ideas	   are	   explicitly	  taken	   from	   other	   countries.	   In	   EU-­‐governance,	   this	   type	   of	   learning	   has	   been	  institutionalized	   with	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   OMC,	   which	   aims	   at	   facilitating	  learning	  amongst	  EU	  member	  states.	  In	  the	  reports	  on	  policy	  learning,	  which	  we	  produced	  in	  the	  INSPIRES-­‐project,	   there	  were	  some	  instances	  of	   learning	   in	  the	  sense	   that	   ideas	   were	   taken	   from	   other	   countries,	   however,	   without	   explicitly	  referencing	   to	   the	  OMC.	  Some	  of	   the	  examples	  mentioned	   in	   the	   text	  were	   that	  Greece,	   Italy	   and	   Spain	   tried	   to	   learn	   from	   Germany	   in	   the	   field	   of	   youth	  unemployment	  during	  the	  crisis.	  In	  Sweden,	  ideas	  for	  the	  job	  guarantee	  program	  for	   the	   youth	   came	   from	   similar	  programs,	   in	  Denmark	   and	   the	  UK.	  The	  Dutch	  participation	  law	  was	  inspired	  by	  experiences	  in	  Belgium	  and	  Germany	  and	  ideas	  on	   the	   decentralization	   of	   welfare	   services	   came	   from	   Sweden.	   The	   German	  minimum	   wage	   law	   was	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   the	   British	   legislation	   –	  policymakers	  and	  experts	  undertook	  several	  fact	  finding	  missions	  to	  the	  UK.	  The	  Swiss	   government	   took	   ideas	   from	   an	   Australian	   and	   Canadian	   project	   on	   the	  reintegration	   of	   handicapped	   individuals	   in	   the	   labour	  market	   and	   the	   reports	  mention	   several	   instances	   of	   U.S.	   experiences	   inspiring	   reform	   in	   European	  countries.	  7. Learning	   from	   subnational	   governments:	   Learning	   occurred	   not	   only	   between	  governments,	  but	  also	  between	  subnational	  governments.	  Particularly,	  there	  are	  two	   example	   for	   this.	   Firstly,	   in	   Switzerland,	   learning	   between	   cantonal	  governments	   is	   an	   important	   feature	   of	   the	   invalidity	   insurance,	   because	   the	  cantonal	   invalidity	   insurance	   offices	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	   implementation	  process.	  Implementation	  practices	  vary	  between	  cantons,	  and	  the	  national	  office	  for	   social	   insurances	   tries	   to	   facilitate	   an	   exchange	   of	   practices	   between	   the	  various	  cantonal	  offices,	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  overall	  performance	  of	  the	  invalidity	  insurance.	  There	  has	  been	  a	  similar	  dynamic	  regarding	  the	   introduction	  of	  case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Another	  reason	  was	  that	  other	  sectorial	  minimum	  wage	  projects	  failed.	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management	   in	   vocational	   training.	   In	  Belgium,	   the	   reforms	  of	   the	  national	   job	  monitoring	  schemes	  were	  based	  on	  experiences	  in	  the	  Flemish	  region.	  8. Learning	   from	   international	   actors:	   Eventually,	   the	   reports	   discussed	   learning	  from	   international	   actors.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   non-­‐binding	   EU	   guidelines	   and	  strategies	  played	  important	  roles	  in	  this	  regard,	  for	  example	  in	  Belgium,	  but	  also	  in	   Spain.	   Yet,	   regarding	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   EU,	   it	   is	   always	   important	   to	  distinguish	   the	   influence	   of	   ideas	   from	   financial	   incentives.	   Countries	   might	  change	   policies	   according	   to	   European	   guidelines	   in	   order	   to	   have	   better	  conditions	   for	   receiving	   financial	   support,	   rather	   than	   adapting	   their	   own	  policies.	   Another	   important	   element	   is	   the	  OECD.	   Its	   reports	   are	  mentioned	   as	  important	  sources	   for	  national	  governments	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  evaluation	  of	  their	   policies	   and	   instruments.	   However,	   the	   actual	   influence	   of	   the	   country-­‐specific	  recommendations	  on	  policy	  outputs	  are	  not	  always	  clear.	  
To	  conclude,	  there	  is	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  in	  how	  governments	  learn.	  These	  entail	  learning	  from	  others	  and	  own	  experiences	  as	  well	  as	  from	  international	  actors	  and	  organisations.	  Concerning	  the	  method	  of	  learning,	  statistical	  information	  is	  very	  important,	  as	  well	  as	  expert	   participation	   and	   commissions,	   although	   the	   latter	   two	  are	  more	   vulnerable	   to	  political	   influence.	   Experiments	   and	   pilots	   are	   important,	   but	   especially	   for	   the	  implementation	   of	   policies.	   Oftentimes,	   governments	   decide	   about	   a	   policy,	   and	  commission	   experiments	   and	  pilots	   afterwards.	   If	   the	   experiment	   is	   conducted	  before	  and	  fails,	   it	  might	  happen	  that	  a	  policy	  is	  being	  changed	  anyways.	  Time	  seems	  to	  be	  of	  crucial	  importance	  for	  learning.	  We	  only	  see	  a	  strong	  impact	  of	  learning	  –	  understood	  as	  the	  implementation	  of	  new	  ideas	  that	  are	  certainly	  proven	  to	  work	  –	  if	  there	  is	  enough	  time	   to	   conduct	   research.	   Often,	   this	   is	   however	   not	   the	   case	   as	   decision	  makers	   are	  unable	  and/or	  unwilling	  to	  wait	   for	  a	  solution	  to	  be	  ripe	  according	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  scientific	   evidence,	   since	  windows	  of	   opportunity	   for	  decision-­‐making	  open	  and	   close.	  Therefore,	   learning	   seems	   to	  play	  an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   implementation	  phase	  of	   a	  policy.	  Politicisation	  and	  learning	  Our	  results	  have	  shown	  that	  learning	  processes	  have	  been	  a	  part	  of	  labour	  market	  and	  social	  policies	  adaptation	  in	  Europe.	  Whether	  these	  learning	  processes	  have	  led	  to	  policy	  change	  –	  or	  were	  included	  therein	  –	  depends	  on	  the	  problem	  pressure	  in	  a	  certain	  policy	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field.	  A	   second	  element	   that	   is	   important	   for	  whether	   learning	  has	   an	   effect	   on	  policy	  change	   is	   the	  politicisation	  of	   a	  problem,	  namely	  whether	   a	   reform	  proposal	  needs	   to	  pass	  political	  deadlocks.	   In	  these	  cases,	  solutions	  that	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  useful	  by	  independent	   experts	   might	   be	   changed	   considerably,	   in	   order	   to	   pass	   a	   process	   of	  consensus	   finding.	  Another	   form	  of	  politicisation	  entails	  political	   learning	  –	  actors	  use	  innovative	  ideas	  primarily	  to	  improve	  their	  political	  strategy.	  Rather	  than	  only	  focusing	  on	  policy	  change,	  parties	  and	  interest	  groups	  seek	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  reform	  policies	  and	  to	  stay	   in	  power,	   in	  case	  of	  doubt;	   they	  would	  however	  prioritize	  their	  own	  interests.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  might	  be	  a	  lot	  of	  symbolic	  action,	  namely	  that	  unnecessary	  or	  even	  damaging	  policies	  are	  put	  into	  place	  for	  political	  reasons,	  i.e.	  to	  seek	  electoral	  support.	  
The	  mentioned	   dynamics	   have	   influenced	   reforms	   in	   the	   countries	   that	  we	   observed.	  For	  example	  in	  Germany,	  the	  project	  of	  implementing	  a	  nationwide	  minimum	  wage	  took	  a	   long	   time	   before	   it	   became	   a	   law,	   notably	   due	   to	   the	   consensual	   elements	   in	   the	  national	   political	   system,	   such	   as	   the	   connection	   between	   parties	   and	   organized	  interests,	   and	   parliamentary	   bicameralism.	   Although	   evidence	   was	   available	   from	  abroad	   (UK)	   and	   domestically	   contending	   that	   a	  minimum	  wage	  was	   very	   unlikely	   to	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  job	  market,	  it	  took	  a	  long	  time	  until	  the	  reform	  was	  finally	  implemented.	  The	  adaptation	  of	  early	  retirement	  age	  is	  a	  similar	  example.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	   were	   a	   number	   of	   gradual	   reforms,	   in	   Germany,	   which	   slowly	   adjusted	   the	  retirement	  age	  from	  the	  late	  1990s	  until	  2013.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  German	  retirement	  age	  could	   not	   be	   sustained	   was	   already	   known	   before	   1995.	   However,	   due	   to	   political	  reasons	  governments	  decided	  not	  to	  adapt	  retirement	  age	  immediately	  and	  abruptly.	  
In	  Belgium	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  retirement	  age	  and	  pension	  reforms	  have	  faced	  similar	  challenges.	   In	  Belgium,	  the	  “Generation	  Pact”	  (2005),	  which	  was	  a	  major	  reform	  of	  the	  pension	   system,	   as	   it	   created	   benefits	   for	   labour	   market	   re-­‐entry,	   is	   politically	   still	  contested.	   Similarly,	   the	   augmentation	   of	   the	   pension	   age	   in	   2012	  was	   not	   free	   from	  political	  conflict;	  however,	  backed	  by	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  pension	  reform	  commission,	  the	   right-­‐wing	   government	   pushed	   the	   reform	   through	   parliament	   without	   a	   lot	   of	  consultation.	  What	  is	  more,	  in	  the	  Belgium	  case,	  EU	  commission	  reports	  seemed	  to	  have	  impacted	   the	   reform	   considerably.	   In	   the	   Netherlands,	   increasing	   the	   retirement	   age	  was	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  since	  the	  late	  1990s,	  but	  a	  reform	  compromise	  could	  only	  be	  found	  in	  2013	  and	  2015.	  Until	  then,	  parties	  that	  put	  an	  augmentation	  of	  the	  retirement	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age	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  had	  suffered	  devastating	   losses	   in	  popularity	  and	  the	   issue	  had	  become	  like	  a	  red	  rag	  for	  a	  bull	  to	  the	  electorate.	  This	  time	  of	  politicisation	  ended	  during	  the	  crisis.	  
The	   reform	   projects	   of	   the	   Swiss	   invalidity	   insurance	   are	   another	   example	   for	   how	  politicisation	  of	  a	  problem	  impeded	  policy	  learning.	  In	  1999,	  a	  reform	  failed	  in	  a	  popular	  vote,	   which	   had	   entailed	   some	  measures	   to	   deal	   early	   on	   with	   the	   high	   debts	   in	   the	  invalidity	   insurance.	   In	  order	   to	   adapt,	   three	  other	   reforms	   followed.	  Firstly,	   a	   reform	  that	  tightened	  controls	  for	  the	  cantonal	  insurance	  offices	  and	  aimed	  at	  creating	  unified	  standards,	  in	  2004.	  Secondly,	  in	  2008,	  the	  invalidity	  insurance	  changed	  when	  preventive	  and	   early	   detection	   instruments	   became	   the	   primary	   instrument	   of	   intervention,	   and	  decisions	  for	  pensions	  took	  only	  a	  secondary	  role.	  Thirdly,	  in	  2012,	  budget	  consolidation	  in	   the	   invalidity	   insurance	  was	  put	   forward.	  The	   fact	   that	  a	   first	   reform	  attempt	   failed	  led	   to	   more	   profound	   measures	   including	   a	   strong	   focus	   on	   re-­‐integration	   and	  prevention	  efforts.	  
These	   examples	   show	   what	   we	   already	   know	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	  politicisation	   and	   institutional	   change,	   namely	   that	   highly	   politicised	   policies	   are	  unlikely	   to	   change,	  because	   stakeholders	  defend	   their	   interests	   and	   returns.	  However,	  with	   regard	   to	   policy	   learning	   these	   findings	   imply	   that	   countries	   with	   more	   veto	  players	   and	   institutional	   veto	   structures	   tend	   to	   slow	   down	   the	   learning	   process	   and	  politicise	  problems.	  This	  is	  particularly	  obvious	  regarding	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  retirement	  age	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  a	  change	  was	  necessary,	  but	  due	  to	  electoral	  interests,	  policymakers	  avoided	  reforms	  until	  the	  crisis	  provided	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity.	  However,	   in	   Switzerland	   and	  Germany,	   the	   reform	  of	   the	   introduction	   of	  the	   minimum	   wage	   and	   the	   invalidity	   insurance	   reforms	   are	   open	   to	   different	  interpretations.	   Firstly,	   in	   Germany,	   there	   was	   no	   majority	   for	   policy	   change	   until	  evidence	   was	   absolutely	   convincing	   that	   a	   national	   minimum	   wage	   would	   not	   have	  negative	   effects	   on	   the	   economy	   –	   and	   other	   options	   for	   sector	  wide	  minimum	  wage	  agreements	  were	  not	  possible.	  In	  Switzerland,	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  reform	  in	  1999	  triggered	  a	  number	  of	  profound	  reforms,	  notably	  taking	  into	  account	  preventive	  and	  re-­‐integrative	  measures	  before	  cutting	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  invalidity	  insurance.	  Clearly,	  both	  cases	  entail	  evidence	  for	  political	  learning,	  because	  policymakers	  sought	  for	  strategies	  to	  adapt	  and	  stay	  in	  control.	  However,	  the	  demands	  for	  consensus	  slowed	  the	  political	  process	  down	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and	  created	  also	  time	  to	  propose	  alternative	  solution	  and	  evidence	  that	  could	  later	  on	  be	  used	  on	  the	  reform	  process.	  
The	   counterfactual	   to	   this	   interpretation	   is	   that	   in	   countries	   with	   less	   veto	   points,	  reforms	   can	  be	  passed	   faster.	   This	   implies	   for	   learning	   that	   a	   less	  politicised	  problem	  should	   lead	   to	   better	   learning	   effects,	   because	   reforms	   are	   not	   being	   slowed	   down.	  However,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   counter-­‐majoritarian	   elements,	  governments	  can	  rather	  push	  their	  own	  projects	  through,	  which	  might	  open	  the	  door	  for	  solutions	   that	   are	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   political	   parties	   rather	   than	   the	   common	   good.	  Examples	  for	  these	  findings	  are	  the	  Swedish	  program	  that	  entailed	  a	   job	  guarantee	  for	  young	  unemployed,	  which	  was	  based	  on	  research	  conducted	  by	  organizations	  that	  are	  close	  to	  the	  governing	  right-­‐wing	  party.	  Similarly,	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  British	  pathway	  to	  work	  program,	  which	  has	  been	  sold	  by	  the	  first	  Cameron	  government	  as	  being	  “all	  new,”	  but	  in	  fact	  it	  resembled	  closely	  to	  the	  previous	  program.	  But	  the	  rather	  broad	  majority	  allowed	  the	  government	  to	  present	  a	  solution	  that	  it	  could	  claim	  to	  be	  all-­‐new	  and	  make	  symbolic	  reforms.	  
Two	   other	   examples	   are	   the	   Greek	   anti-­‐crisis	   policies	   and	   the	   Hungarian	   pathway	   to	  work	  scheme,	  although	  they	  originate	  in	  entirely	  different	  political	  motives.	  Many	  of	  the	  reforms	   in	   Greece	   are	   motivated	   by	   external	   pressure,	   but	   also	   by	   the	   goal	   to	   attain	  electoral	  support.	  For	  example	  the	  temporal	  work	  program	  that	  was	  created	  in	  2011	  by	  the	   Papandreou	   government	   against	   the	   opposition	   of	   the	   conservative	   party.	   The	  program	   hired	   recipients	   for	   five	   to	   seven	   months	   for	   public	   work.	   The	   idea	   for	   the	  program	  originated	  in	  Greece	  and	  was	  financed	  by	  the	  European	  Social	  Fund.	  Later	  on	  Syriza	  successfully	  politicised	   this	  problem.	  A	  second	  example	   is	   the	  pathway	   to	  work	  program	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  put	  into	  place,	  as	  of	  2009.	  The	  program	  allows	  government	   to	   put	   unemployed	  who	   can	  work	   into	   a	   general	   work	   scheme,	  which	   is	  needs-­‐based	  and	  forces	  recipients	  to	  cooperate	  if	  they	  want	  to	  keep	  their	  benefits,	  and	  forces	  them	  to	  do	  public	  work.	  The	  reform	  passed	  parliament	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	   ample	   evidence	   that	   these	   programs	   have	   no	   effect	   on	   regular	   labour	   market	  reintegration,	  as	  they	  generated	  electoral	  support.	  
To	  sum	  up,	  this	  section	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  politicisation	  of	  problems	  impedes	  the	  effect	  of	  learning	  on	  policy	  change,	  for	  example	  because	  governments	  have	  electoral	  interests.	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A	  second	  reason	  that	  can	  reduce	  the	  impact	  of	  learning	  in	  the	  reform	  process	  is	  the	  need	  to	  build	  a	  broad	  consensus.	  However,	  the	  results	  show	  also	  that	  consensual	  institutions	  create	   a	   favourable	   environment	   for	   learning,	   because	   they	   slow	   down	   the	   decision	  making	  process	  and	  create	  time	  for	  research	  on	  solutions	  before	  a	  reform	  is	  being	  put	  into	   legislation.	   Otherwise,	   governments	   tend	   to	   quickly	   respond	   to	   problems	   and	  learning	   follows	   after	   that	   during	   the	   implementation	   process.	   In	   other	   words,	  politicization	  might	  be	  positive,	  as	  it	  creates	  the	  time	  for	  learning.	  Conclusion	  In	   this	   report,	   we	   compared	   the	   findings	   of	   11	   country	   reports	   that	   analysed	   the	  adaptation	  of	   labour	  market	  and	  social	  policy	  reforms	  and	  the	  role	  of	   learning	  therein.	  We	  started	  our	  analysis,	  with	  two	  main	  hypotheses,	  namely	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  learning	  depends	  on	  problem	  pressures	  and	  the	  politicisation	  of	  a	  given	  problem.	  Particularly,	  we	  hold	  that	  very	  high	  or	  very	  low	  problem	  pressure	  as	  well	  as	  a	  considerable	  politicisation	  of	   a	   problem	   have	   negative	   effects	   on	   policy	   learning.	   Our	   empirical	   results	   partly	  confirm	   our	   hypotheses,	   but	   provide	   also	   some	   interesting	   results	   that	   do	   not	  match	  with	  our	  theoretical	  expectations.	  
1. As	   expected,	   problem	   pressure	   has	   positive	   and	   negative	   effects	   on	   policy	  learning.	   In	  order	  to	  trigger	  a	   learning	  process	  that	  might	  potentially	   impact	  on	  reforms,	   some	   kind	   of	   problem	   pressure	   –	   economical,	   demographical,	   or	  political	   –	   needs	   to	   be	   present.	   Yet,	   if	   the	   problem	  pressure	   becomes	   too	   high,	  policy	   makers	   tend	   to	   favour	   fast	   solutions,	   which	   reduce	   the	   capacity	   and	  possibility	  for	  a	  learning-­‐based	  result,	  at	  least	  prior	  to	  the	  decision	  about	  a	  given	  policy.	   These	   kinds	   of	   dynamics	   have	   become	   apparent	   during	   the	   crisis,	  especially	   in	   Southern	   European	   countries,	   when	   governments	   implemented	  fundamental	   reforms	   very	   quickly,	   without	   assessing	   their	   potential	   impact	  beforehand.	   The	   reasons	   for	   this	   are	   obviously	   the	   immense	   economic	   and	  political	  pressure,	  which	  have	  however	   impeded	  on	   learning.	  Yet,	   the	  crisis	  has	  also	   positive	   effects	   regarding	   the	   connection	   between	   learning	   and	   policy	  pressure,	   because	   the	   crisis	   context	   created	  windows	   of	   opportunity	   for	   policy	  change.	  2. The	  reports	  revealed	  different	  forms	  of	  learning,	  which	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  types	  of	  learning:	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a. Firstly,	   there	   is	   imposed	   learning	   or	   compliance.	   This	   entails	   that	  countries	   change	   policy	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   external	   political	   pressure	  rather	   than	   the	   adaptation	   of	   preferences	   and	   beliefs	   due	   to	   factual	  knowledge	  and	  research	  input.	  b. Secondly,	   there	   is	   observational	   learning.	   This	   entails	   policy	   learning	  based	  on	  the	  observation	  and	  experiences	  of	  other	  countries,	  subnational	  governments	   but	   also	   from	   international	   actors.	   The	   differences	   to	  imposed	   learning	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	   power	   involved,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  policy	   changes	   occur	   as	   a	   consequences	   of	   observation	   of	   others	   rather	  than	  by	  the	  imposition	  of	  new	  ideas.	  c. Intentional	   learning	   is	   the	   third	   form	  of	   learning	   that	   can	  be	   retrieved	  from	   this	   research.	   Notably,	   it	   comprises	   of	   learning	   from	   statistical	  information,	  experts,	  but	  also	  pilots	  and	  econometric	  models.	  The	  impact	  of	   learning	  in	  the	  policy	  process	  differs.	  Experts	  are	  often	  heard	  before	  a	  law	   is	   actually	   decided	   whereas	   pilots	   and	   experiments	   are	   being	  consulted	  prior	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  policy.	  3. The	  third	  finding	  is	  that	  the	  politicisation	  of	  problems	  has	  an	  important	  effect	  on	  whether	  learning	  impacts	  on	  policy	  change	  or	  not.	  We	  found	  evidence,	  according	  to	  which	   in	   countries	  with	  many	   counter-­‐majoritarian	   institutions	   the	   speed	  of	  change	  was	   slow.	  However,	   this	  was	  not	   necessarily	   negative	   for	   the	   impact	   of	  learning,	  because	  a	  long	  political	  process	  creates	  time	  for	  learning	  to	  happen	  and	  to	  influence	  on	  the	  formulation	  of	  solutions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  countries	  with	  less	   institutional	  veto	  points,	  reforms	  pass	   faster,	  but	   learning	  occurs	  only	  after	  decision	  making	  –	  during	  the	  implementation	  process.	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Annex	  The	   following	   table	   presents	   the	   case	   studies	   of	   countries	   and	   innovations	   that	   were	  conducted	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  country	  reports	  that	  are	  part	  of	  WP5.	  For	  each	  country,	  I	  am	   presenting	   the	   innovations	   that	   we	   analyzed	   as	   well	   as	   some	   findings	   that	   are	  common	   to	   all	   of	   the	   analyzed	   innovations	   regarding	   policy	   learning,	   if	   the	   authors	  underlined	  this.	  
Table	  1:	  Overview	  of	  policy	  learning	  in	  selected	  labor	  market	  and	  social	  policy	  innovations	  
Country	   Policy	  fields	  and	  
instruments	  
Feedback-­‐
mechanism	  &	  origin	  
of	  solution	  





BE	   InnBE1:	  Increasing	  retirement	  age	  for	  the	  elderly	  and	  keep	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  them	  employed:	  Generation	  pact	  in	  2005	  was	  the	  main	  reform,	  which	  entailed	  later	  retirement	  age,	  re-­‐entry	  incentives,	  compensation	  for	  employers,	  pension	  bonus	  for	  those	  continuing	  to	  work	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  10).	  The	  revision	  of	  the	  reform	  in	  2012	  reformed	  the	  pension	  age	  even	  further	  (66	  by	  2025	  and	  67	  by	  2030)	  plus	  stricter	  regulations	  for	  early	  retirement	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  13).	  
EU	  feedback:	  Country	  specific	  recommendations	  demanded	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  employment	  rate	  of	  the	  elderly.	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  EU	  Strategy	  2020	  set	  a	  target	  for	  employment	  rate	  of	  the	  elderly.	  These	  incentives	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  BE.	  Di	  Rupo	  government	  installed	  a	  Commission	  for	  Pension	  Reform	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  11).	  Domestic	  learning	  through	  the	  pension	  reform	  commission	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  35).	  
Highly	  salient	  issue,	  since	  distributive	  elements	  are	  involved??	  
Pressure	  by	  the	  E.	  Commission	  due	  to	  reports;	  federal	  government	  and	  coalition	  parties	  are	  also	  important	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  12);	  politicized,	  but	  the	  government	  succeeded	  to	  push	  it	  through	  in	  2014;	  Generation	  pact	  is	  still	  very	  contested	  politically	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  26).	  	  Conservatives	  demanded	  budgetary	  discipline	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  36).	  Political	  learning:	  Centre-­‐right	  government	  pushed	  the	  reform	  through	  (2014)	  without	  broad	  consultation	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  too	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much	  politicization	  of	  the	  matter	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  36).	  
InnBE2:	  New	  job	  monitoring	  scheme	  in	  2004:	  Links	  the	  receipt	  of	  unemployment	  benefits	  to	  active	  efforts	  to	  find	  a	  job.	  Non-­‐compliance	  is	  sanctioned;	  2012	  the	  scheme	  was	  extended	  to	  younger	  and	  older	  unemployed;	  2014	  the	  Michel	  government	  has	  planned	  to	  extend	  these	  practices	  to	  target	  groups	  of	  collective	  layoffs	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  10).	  
Flemish	  region	  used	  its	  newly	  gained	  autonomy	  to	  establish	  this	  instrument.	  The	  decision	  was	  based	  on	  projections	  of	  the	  Flemish	  employment	  service	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  16);	  However	  activating	  the	  50+	  did	  not	  work	  so	  well	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  17).	  Learning	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  Flemish	  region	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  37).	  
	   	  
InnBE3:	  Youth	  Employment	  Plan:	  Goal	  was	  to	  increase	  employment	  of	  young;	  established	  by	  a	  decree	  in	  2009	  for	  the	  entire	  Flemish	  region	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  20).	  
The	  idea	  emerged	  from	  the	  EU	  1998	  Employment	  Guidelines	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  19).	  As	  of	  2005	  a	  number	  of	  experiments	  were	  conducted,	  organized	  by	  the	  government	  and	  NGOs	  to	  increase	  employment;	  successfully	  evaluated	  and	  then	  became	  a	  law	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  19-­‐20,	  39).	  
	   Not	  politicized;	  receives	  support	  from	  all	  political	  parties	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  26).	  
Common:	   EU	  recommendations	   	   Change	  of	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and	  OECD	  reports	  are	  important	  for	  all	  policy	  makers	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  27).	  Regions	  seem	  to	  learn	  from	  another.	  The	  Flemish	  PES	  (Public	  Employment	  Service)	  has	  successfully	  completed	  some	  projects	  and	  the	  Wallonian	  government	  is	  learning	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  27-­‐28).	  Recent	  devolution	  
government	  only	  in	  2014	  (Struyven	  and	  Pollet	  2015:	  25).	  
CH	   InnCH1:	  New	  management-­‐by-­‐objectives	  and	  control	  system	  of	  cantonal	  disability	  offices.	  This	  reform	  passed	  the	  national	  parliament	  in	  2004.	  It	  reforms	  the	  oversight	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  over	  the	  cantonal	  offices.	  What	  is	  more,	  it	  created	  regional	  medical	  services	  to	  standardize	  the	  evaluation	  of	  benefit	  claims	  in	  the	  invalidity	  insurance	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  5-­‐6).	  
The	  federal	  government	  proposed	  this	  solution,	  namely	  to	  tighten	  control	  of	  cantonal	  practices	  by	  having	  more	  discretion	  regarding	  the	  cantonal	  offices	  and	  by	  establishing	  state	  medical	  competences	  in	  the	  regional	  medical	  services.	  Another	  option	  would	  have	  been	  to	  raise	  taxes,	  but	  such	  a	  reform	  proposal	  failed	  in	  a	  popular	  referendum,	  in	  1999	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  7-­‐10).	  
The	  reform	  responded	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  too	  high	  debts	  in	  the	  invalidity	  insurance.	  These	  are	  mostly	  debts	  with	  the	  national	  pension	  insurance	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  8).	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  cantonal	  offices	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  deciding	  on	  benefit	  claims,	  but	  they	  report	  to	  the	  cantonal	  government	  and	  not	  the	  federal	  government.	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  cantonal	  offices	  lack	  medical	  competences	  and	  depend	  on	  the	  
Cantons	  vs.	  federal	  government.	  Originally,	  the	  national	  government	  had	  proposed	  that	  the	  regional	  medical	  services	  are	  under	  its	  supervision.	  The	  cantons	  lobbied	  successfully	  against	  this	  strategy	  in	  the	  national	  parliament,	  which	  eventually	  confined	  the	  set-­‐up	  of	  the	  regional	  medical	  services.	  Similarly,	  the	  parliament	  granted	  the	  federal	  office	  of	  social	  insurances	  less	  discretion	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	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assessment	  of	  external	  doctors	  or	  the	  GP	  of	  the	  benefit	  claimant	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  6).	  
the	  cantonal	  offices	  than	  proposed	  by	  the	  national	  government	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  31-­‐32).	  
InnCH2:	  New	  set	  of	  early	  intervention	  instruments	  for	  new	  disability	  benefit	  claimants.	  Specifically,	  the	  reform	  created	  new	  instruments	  to	  prevent	  individuals	  with	  disabilities	  from	  becoming	  dependent	  on	  pensions	  early	  on.	  This	  reform	  entailed	  a	  change	  in	  the	  order	  of	  the	  instruments	  used	  in	  the	  invalidity	  insurance	  by	  putting	  prevention	  before	  pensions	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  12-­‐14).	  
The	  solution	  was	  suggested	  by	  the	  national	  government.	  Eventually,	  the	  law	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  private	  organizations	  to	  propose	  pilots	  for	  measures	  aiming	  at	  preventing	  individuals	  from	  getting	  too	  quickly	  pensions	  and	  instead	  trying	  to	  reinsert	  them	  into	  the	  labor	  market	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  14-­‐15).	  
Essentially,	  the	  measure	  tried	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  similar	  problem	  than	  the	  previous	  innovation:	  reducing	  the	  debt	  of	  the	  invalidity	  insurance	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  6).	  
This	  innovation	  was	  highly	  politicized	  and	  is	  part	  of	  a	  compromise.	  One-­‐sided	  solutions	  to	  reduce	  debt	  in	  the	  invalidity	  insurance	  either	  by	  tax	  raises	  or	  cuts	  in	  benefits	  had	  no	  majority.	  Consequently,	  political	  parties	  struggled	  to	  find	  a	  compromise	  that	  allowed	  to	  reduce	  costs	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ensured	  simple	  cuts	  in	  benefits	  for	  beneficiaries	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  32-­‐33).	  
InnCH3:	  This	  innovation	  is	  a	  new	  law	  that	  reforms	  vocational	  training	  in	  Switzerland	  (Vocational	  and	  Professional	  Training	  and	  Education	  Act,	  2002).	  The	  law	  regrouped	  all	  training	  programs	  under	  the	  oversight	  of	  the	  federal	  government.	  What	  is	  more,	  it	  created	  a	  
Parliament	  had	  already	  demanded	  to	  reform	  the	  existing	  educational	  training	  system,	  but	  it	  was	  only	  in	  2004	  that	  the	  Federal	  Council	  proposed	  a	  new	  law	  for	  consultation.	  The	  draft	  had	  been	  set	  up	  by	  an	  expert	  commission	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  18).	  Positive	  evaluation	  of	  the	  case	  management	  
Problem	  was	  that	  the	  old	  system	  did	  not	  respond	  anymore	  to	  the	  demands	  to	  the	  apprenticeship	  market	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17-­‐18).	  Many	  youngsters	  could	  not	  find	  places	  for	  an	  apprenticeship	  anymore	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  47).	  
-­‐-­‐	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unified	  upper-­‐secondary	  system	  of	  education,	  which	  had	  not	  been	  the	  case	  before,	  because	  cantons	  had	  many	  fragmented	  solutions	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  18).	  
in	  2007	  (Bonoli	  et	  al.	  2015:	  48-­‐49).	  
Common:	  	   	   	   	  
GER	   InnGER1:	  Statutory	  Minimum	  Wage	  (2015);	  History	  of	  sector	  wide	  minimum	  wages	  in	  Germany,	  which	  also	  applied	  to	  foreign	  workers	  (Posting	  of	  Workers	  Act,	  first	  application	  in	  1996).	  After	  2007,	  other	  sectors	  followed	  and	  were	  included	  under	  the	  Act	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  12).	  
Unions	  started	  to	  put	  the	  program	  on	  the	  national	  political	  agenda	  in	  2002;	  the	  proposal	  was	  supported	  by	  independent	  research	  institutes,	  i.e.	  the	  German	  Institute	  for	  Economic	  Research	  or	  the	  Institute	  for	  Employment	  Research)	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  48).	  	  Problem	  was	  the	  decline	  of	  collective	  agreements	  in	  many	  sectors	  and	  an	  increasing	  wage	  disparity	  between	  East	  and	  West	  Germany	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  9-­‐10).	  	  The	  application	  of	  the	  minimum	  wage	  in	  many	  sectors	  served	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐
	   Opposition	  of	  the	  reform	  came	  especially	  from	  the	  employer’s	  organizations,	  but	  also	  the	  unions	  were	  not	  immediately	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  ideas,	  because	  they	  were	  afraid	  to	  lose	  bargaining	  autonomy	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  8,	  11-­‐12,	  19).	  	  Especially,	  business	  opposition	  was	  strong.	  Their	  opposition	  was	  successful	  after	  the	  election	  of	  2005.	  However,	  in	  2013,	  all	  the	  other	  parties,	  except	  for	  the	  business	  wing	  of	  the	  CDU	  were	  convinced	  that	  a	  general	  minimum	  wage	  was	  necessary	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  12,	  19).	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experiment.	  	  In	  2009,	  the	  existing	  sectorial	  minimum	  wages	  were	  evaluated	  in	  eight	  sectors	  and	  no	  negative	  effect	  could	  be	  found	  for	  employment	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  12).	  	  Apart	  from	  that	  there	  were	  several	  fact	  finding	  missions	  to	  the	  UK	  by	  parliamentarians	  from	  both	  big	  parties	  and	  trade	  union	  representatives	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  minimum	  wage	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  18,49).	  	  Favorable	  economic	  situation	  in	  2015	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  introduce	  a	  minimum	  wage	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  49).	  
	  Yet,	  the	  decisive	  event	  for	  introducing	  the	  minimum	  wage	  was	  the	  failure	  to	  reach	  a	  collective	  agreement	  for	  the	  hospitality	  and	  retail	  sector;	  then	  the	  CDU	  decided	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  wage	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  20).	  
InnGER2:	  Reduction	  of	  early	  retirement	  age;	  this	  innovation	  covers	  a	  number	  of	  reforms	  from	  the	  early	  1990s	  until	  2009,	  when	  national	  governments	  in	  Germany	  
Most	  important	  for	  this	  reform	  were	  cost	  pressure,	  which	  were	  even	  aggravated	  by	  the	  Maastricht	  treaty	  and	  the	  deficit	  ceilings;	  what	  is	  more,	  the	  weak	  economic	  situation	  
	   Usually,	  the	  scientific	  literature	  regards	  the	  reform	  of	  1992	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  consensus	  not	  only	  of	  the	  conservative	  party,	  but	  also	  the	  trade	  unions	  and	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  in	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continuously	  increased	  retirement	  age	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  30);	  These	  innovations	  occurred:	  Stage	  1:	  1992,	  entering	  into	  force	  2001,	  but	  was	  advanced	  in	  1997:	  Gradual	  increase	  of	  respective	  retirement	  ages	  for	  particular	  groups	  Stage	  2:	  Acceleration	  of	  the	  process	  of	  phasing-­‐out	  the	  options	  for	  early	  retirement	  (1996),	  Raising	  upper-­‐threshold	  for	  the	  early	  pension	  for	  severely	  disabled	  (1999),	  Raising	  threshold	  for	  the	  early	  pension	  for	  unemployed	  &	  Abolition	  of	  early	  retirement	  for	  part	  time	  unemployed	  (2004);	  Standard	  retirement	  with	  67	  (2007);	  New	  early	  retirement	  scheme	  for	  those	  contributing	  45	  years	  and	  more	  (2007/2013)	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  31)	  
and	  Germany	  reunification	  put	  additional	  pressure	  on	  the	  German	  pension	  system	  (GER-­‐Rep,	  34-­‐38,	  36).	  	  Role	  of	  commissions	  increased	  and	  those	  of	  social	  partners	  decreased	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  37).	  	  Creation	  of	  a	  new	  early	  retirement	  scheme	  in	  2005	  was	  very	  close	  to	  the	  suggestions	  of	  the	  independent	  Herzog-­‐Commission	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  39).	  	  Learning	  in	  this	  reform	  occurred	  in	  three	  ways:	  	  a).	  Expert	  network	  (pension	  experts	  from	  social	  partners,	  ministries	  and	  political	  parties),	  which	  informally	  prepared	  the	  reforms	  in	  1992	  &	  1999	  based	  on	  the	  statistical	  information	  -­‐>	  depoliticized	  and	  de-­‐parliamentarized	  political	  process.	  
the	  national	  parliament.	  CDU	  and	  employers	  had	  already	  been	  in	  favor	  of	  more	  liberalization	  during	  the	  1980s	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  34).	  Social	  democrats	  and	  unions	  were	  opposed	  as	  they	  were	  afraid	  of	  raising	  unemployment	  rates,	  but	  the	  projections	  of	  an	  ageing	  population	  and	  the	  cost	  thereof	  for	  the	  retirement	  system	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  35)	  	  Increasing	  politicization	  of	  the	  pension	  politics	  after	  1999,	  when	  the	  CDU	  as	  well	  as	  the	  SPD	  both	  created	  their	  own	  expert	  commissions	  to	  propose	  suggestions	  for	  how	  to	  stabilize	  the	  system	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  38).	  	  Despites	  politicization	  some	  suggestions	  of	  the	  independent	  Rürup-­‐commission	  passed	  parliament	  in	  2004,	  but	  the	  standard	  
34	  	  
After	  the	  politicization	  of	  the	  reform	  process,	  expert	  commission	  replaced	  the	  informal	  network;	  many	  of	  their	  suggestions	  were	  implemented	  -­‐>	  electoral	  suicide	  for	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  40-­‐41).	  	  No	  direct	  EU	  influence,	  but	  Maastricht	  is	  important.	  
retirement	  age	  was	  not	  raised,	  because	  it	  was	  deemed	  too	  dangerous	  politically.	  	  The	  interest	  of	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  for	  the	  renewal	  of	  the	  early	  retirement	  age	  becomes	  also	  apparent	  in	  the	  launching	  of	  some	  projects	  to	  find	  options	  for	  re-­‐introducing	  early	  retirement.	  Eventually,	  none	  of	  these	  options	  could	  be	  retained	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  34).	  	  Overall	  broad	  consensus	  that	  the	  reform	  is	  necessary;	  the	  incremental	  changes	  from	  1992-­‐2007	  occurred	  in	  a	  way	  that	  no	  severe	  cuts	  needed	  to	  be	  made.	  Even	  when	  the	  issue	  became	  more	  politicized,	  there	  was	  no	  overall	  rupture	  of	  the	  political	  consensus	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  50).	  
InnGER3:	  Perspective	  50’plus	  -­‐	  a	  national	  program	  for	  older	  jobseekers:	  
The	  German	  “culture	  of	  early	  retirement”	  had	  incentivized	  many	  elderly	  
	   Program	  was	  launched	  by	  the	  Federal	  Ministry	  for	  Employment	  and	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Launched	  by	  the	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  Employment	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  in	  mid2005,	  six	  month	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  Hartz	  IV.	  The	  program	  phased	  out	  in	  2015:	  Job-­‐centers	  could	  apply	  for	  funding	  to	  get	  support	  jobseekers	  50plus;	  German	  money	  only	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  43).	  
jobseekers	  to	  use	  unemployment	  benefits	  to	  create	  pathways	  into	  retirement.	  Hartz	  IV	  made	  this	  strategy	  considerably	  more	  complicated.	  Therefore,	  this	  program	  was	  set-­‐up	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  44).	  	  Positive	  evaluation	  of	  the	  program	  in	  terms	  of	  re-­‐integration	  of	  recipients	  in	  the	  labor	  market,	  but	  not	  many	  of	  them	  managed	  to	  make	  a	  living	  due	  to	  low	  salaries.	  	  Government	  documents	  referred	  to	  the	  Stockholm	  targets	  (2001:	  50%	  employment	  rate	  of	  elderly	  by	  2010),	  but	  there	  was	  no	  explicit	  learning	  and	  transfer	  of	  ideas	  like	  the	  British	  New	  Deal	  50+	  (2000	  to	  2009)	  or	  the	  Finnish	  National	  Program	  on	  Ageing	  Workers	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  46).	  	  The	  successful	  
Social	  Affairs	  without	  adding	  further	  legislation	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  43).	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implementation	  of	  50+	  lead	  to	  subsequent	  programs	  in	  Germany	  (Jansen	  and	  Knuth	  2015:	  46-­‐47).	  
Common:	   	   	   	  
GRE	   InnGR1:	  	  Temporal	  employment	  for	  public	  benefit	  2011:	  Five	  to	  seven	  months	  temporary	  employment	  for	  public	  benefit	  (i.e.	  cleaning	  of	  municipalities);	  around	  500Euro	  wage	  plus	  social	  insurance	  contributions	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  10).	  Had	  already	  been	  applied	  during	  the	  1990s	  in	  regions	  with	  very	  high	  unemployment,	  but	  for	  a	  period	  for	  12-­‐24	  months	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  39).	  
Idea	  originated	  domestically	  by	  the	  Greek	  government	  and	  was	  financed	  by	  the	  ESF	  (European	  Social	  fund)	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  10).	  Problem	  in	  the	  implementation,	  recipients	  felt	  like	  beneficiaries	  rather	  than	  employees	  -­‐>	  basically	  no	  one	  could	  find	  a	  permanent	  job	  after	  the	  program	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  11-­‐12).	  Following	  some	  of	  the	  OMCs,	  these	  some	  temporary	  works	  programs	  had	  been	  created	  in	  the	  form	  of	  internships	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  26-­‐28).	  After	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis,	  the	  issue	  was	  discussed	  with	  Greek	  experts	  who	  worked	  on	  this	  issue	  abroad;	  Syriza	  took	  it	  up	  in	  
	   Politicized	  policy	  process.	  Opposition	  parties	  were	  against	  the	  measure	  and	  demanded	  more,	  to	  establish	  more	  sustainable	  measures	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  10).	  	  Public	  work	  politicized	  issue	  by	  Syriza.	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2015	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  40).	  
InnGR2:	  Voucher	  Scheme	  to	  finance	  temporary	  training	  of	  unemployed	  in	  private	  companies,	  created	  2011.	  The	  voucher	  financed	  training	  and	  employment	  of	  the	  recipient	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  12-­‐13).	  
The	  OECD	  had	  suggested	  such	  a	  program	  already	  earlier	  on	  (2005),	  but	  the	  introduction	  in	  Greece	  failed.	  Only	  in	  2011,	  when	  the	  crisis	  pressure	  had	  augmented	  considerably,	  the	  program	  was	  implemented.	  Funds	  came	  from	  the	  ESF	  (European	  Social	  Fund)	  2011	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  12).	  These	  vouchers	  had	  been	  part	  of	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  EU,	  namely	  the	  EES	  2011	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  13-­‐14).	  	  During	  the	  crisis,	  unemployment	  amongst	  Greek	  youth	  had	  reached	  more	  than	  60	  percent,	  only	  then	  the	  government	  reacted	  2011	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  13-­‐14).	  Measures	  were	  based	  on	  the	  secured	  EU-­‐funds	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  14).	  
	   The	  committee	  (Scientific	  Committee	  of	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Association	  of	  Vocational	  Training	  to	  Employment)	  that	  proposed	  the	  reform	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  employment	  was	  divided.	  Some	  members	  opposed	  the	  suggestions,	  arguing	  that	  it	  would	  put	  too	  much	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  individual	  responsibility	  and	  weaken	  the	  state’s	  duties	  to	  care	  for	  the	  unemployed	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  41).	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Problem:	  Program	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  many	  young	  people	  to	  reenter	  the	  labor	  market	  for	  a	  longer	  time	  period;	  most	  dropped	  out	  after	  the	  program	  had	  finished	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  15).	  Ideas	  were	  transferred	  from	  the	  experience	  in	  other	  countries,	  but	  not	  adapted	  to	  the	  Greek	  labor	  market	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  21).	  	  Discussed	  the	  first	  time	  during	  the	  crisis;	  idea	  came	  from	  a	  guy	  who	  were	  a	  former	  officer	  in	  Brussels	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  41).	  	  The	  then	  Pasok	  government	  adopted	  the	  program	  following	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IMF	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  42).	  
InnGR3:	  Stricter	  rules	  for	  obtaining	  a	  full	  pension	  since	  
External	  pressure	  	  Frist	  attempts	  to	  
Highly	  salient	  issue	  during	  the	  crisis,	  of	  course	  
Greek	  pension	  reforms	  had	  been	  postponed	  since	  the	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2015.	  Notably,	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  pensions	  will	  be	  calculated	  according	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  years,	  not	  only	  the	  best	  five	  years	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17).	  
reform	  the	  Greek	  pension	  system	  had	  been	  made	  in	  1997	  by	  a	  former	  IMF	  chairman	  who	  predicted	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Greek	  pension	  system	  by	  2005;	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  UK	  actuaries	  recommended	  to	  significantly,	  reform	  the	  pension	  system	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  37).	  	  Reform	  returned	  to	  the	  table	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  the	  Troika	  
mid-­‐1990s.	  It	  had	  been	  very	  clear	  that	  the	  demand	  for	  financing	  would	  explore,	  but	  a	  consensus	  on	  a	  real	  reform	  could	  not	  be	  found	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17).	  Unions	  and	  other	  actors	  challenge	  reforms	  in	  court,	  often	  successfully,	  because	  they	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  parliamentary	  decision-­‐making	  process	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  21).	  Pasok	  and	  the	  labor	  unions	  opposed	  the	  reform	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  presenting	  other	  calculations	  and	  evidence	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  37).	  
Common:	   Troika	  and	  the	  memorandums	  affect	  agenda-­‐setting	  of	  issues	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17).	  
	   Lack	  of	  consultation	  before	  reforms	  already	  prior	  to	  the	  crisis;	  even	  less	  regarding	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  troika	  demanded	  anti-­‐crisis	  policies;	  often	  (Papadopoulou	  et	  al.	  2015:	  21).	  
HU	   InnHU1:	  First	  program	  created	  in	   There	  was	  one	  prior	  program,	  which	  the	   	   Initiated	  by	  the	  national	  government	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2005,	  others	  followed	  2007	  and	  2012,	  extending	  the	  benefits	  to	  other	  vulnerable	  groups.	  The	  START	  cards	  (START,	  START	  PLUS,	  START	  EXTRA,	  START	  BONUS	  and	  START	  REGION)	  are	  essentially	  a	  wage	  subsidy,	  which	  grants	  tax	  reliefs	  for	  wages	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  21-­‐22).	  
World	  Bank	  had	  funded	  in	  the	  1990s	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  26).	  	  In	  the	  2007,	  employment	  rate	  of	  the	  population	  overall	  and	  especially	  the	  young	  was	  particularly	  low	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  26,	  44).	  	  	  As	  of	  2008,	  the	  public	  employment	  rate	  exploded	  Program	  was	  funded	  by	  the	  EU	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  49).	  The	  programs	  worked	  well	  and	  the	  targets	  could	  be	  overachieved	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  24).	  	  Program	  was	  funded	  by	  the	  EU,	  therefore	  the	  ideas	  were	  implemented	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  26).	  The	  authors	  estimate	  that	  without	  the	  program,	  unemployment	  in	  Hungary	  would	  be	  considerably	  more	  high	  
(HU-­‐Rep,	  26).	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InnHU2:	  The	  pathway	  to	  work	  scheme;	  started	  in	  January	  2009;	  those	  who	  can	  work	  amongst	  the	  unemployed	  are	  put	  into	  a	  general	  work	  scheme	  and	  need	  to	  do	  public	  work;	  needs-­‐based	  and	  recipients	  need	  to	  cooperate	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  68).	  	  Alignment	  with	  unemployment	  assistance	  in	  2011	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  70).	  	  Fine-­‐tuning	  of	  schemes	  in	  2013	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  70).	  
Similar	  programs	  were	  already	  run	  before	  since	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  had	  been	  re-­‐used	  during	  the	  1990s.	  However,	  it	  was	  only	  during	  the	  crisis	  of	  2009,	  that	  the	  number	  of	  recipients	  in	  the	  program	  exceeded	  tremendously	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  69).	  	  Evidence	  is	  being	  ignored	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  72).	  
	   In	  principle,	  governments	  supported	  the	  issue,	  but	  the	  bureaucracy	  resisted	  these	  programs,	  especially	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  pathway	  to	  work	  scheme	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  70).	  	  Programs	  are	  being	  implemented	  despite	  evidence	  that	  these	  programs	  do	  not	  yield	  good	  results	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  72),	  however	  they	  are	  useful	  to	  attract	  electoral	  support.	  
InnHU3:	  New	  Labor	  Code	  2011;	  The	  reform	  entails	  a	  significant	  flexibilisation	  of	  the	  labor	  market;	  	  	  The	  new	  reform	  put	  considerable	  impetus	  on	  free	  regulations	  between	  unions	  and	  employers,	  which	  would	  weaken	  the	  unions	  even	  further	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  
Not	  based	  on	  any	  experiments	  or	  other	  attempts,	  but	  the	  program	  was	  just	  implemented	  as	  such,	  after	  consulting	  legal	  questions	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  74).	  
	   A	  prior	  reform	  in	  2004	  that	  was	  proposed	  by	  the	  liberal-­‐left	  government	  failed	  due	  to	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  Unions	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  73).	  	  The	  Orban	  government	  had	  excluded	  the	  unions	  from	  consultation	  and	  they	  only	  were	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74).	   heard	  after	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  ILO	  had	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  74).	  
Common:	   	   	   	  
IT	   InnIT1:	  Apprenticeship	  for	  young	  workers;	  three	  adaptations:	  2003,	  2011,	  2013	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  51).	  	  After	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis,	  youth	  unemployment	  increased	  steadily;	  consolidation	  act	  of	  2011	  did	  also	  affect	  the	  youth	  apprentice	  system	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  51-­‐55).	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  2011	  reform	  should	  improve	  the	  network	  of	  social	  partners	  and	  regions	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  14).	  	  	  2013	  reform	  under	  Letta	  and	  the	  2014	  decree	  under	  Renzi	  focused	  on	  simplifying	  contracts	  for	  apprentices,	  tax	  reliefs	  for	  employers	  and	  reduced	  training	  organizations.	  These	  reforms	  withdrew	  
Main	  problem	  of	  the	  first	  reforms	  in	  the	  1990s	  was	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  amongst	  young	  people	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  transition	  to	  the	  labor	  market.	  What	  is	  more,	  as	  of	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  Italian	  government	  wanted	  to	  react	  to	  the	  targets	  set	  by	  the	  Lisbon	  (2000)	  and	  Stockholm	  (2001)	  targets	  and	  tried	  to	  learn	  from	  other	  countries	  (Lengyel	  et	  al.	  2015:	  51-­‐52).	  	  2003	  reform	  followed	  the	  French	  model	  of	  tertiary	  higher	  education	  apprenticeship	  was	  copied	  ,	  and	  evaluations	  were	  made	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  52).	  	  In	  the	  crisis,	  the	  Italian	  government	  turned	  to	  Germany	  
	   Apprenticeship	  has	  a	  bad	  reputation	  in	  Italy,	  contrary	  to	  Austria	  and	  Germany	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  51-­‐55).	  	  2011	  reform	  of	  the	  apprenticeship	  occurred	  in	  the	  context	  of	  austerity,	  which	  interrupted	  earlier	  reforms	  (2003)	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  19).	  	  During	  the	  Monti	  government,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  fact	  finding	  mission	  to	  Germany	  should	  be	  implemented,	  but	  the	  process	  was	  stopped	  after	  the	  changes	  from	  the	  Monti	  to	  the	  Letta	  and	  then	  the	  Renzi	  government.	  Especially	  the	  latter	  change	  ended	  the	  reform	  process	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  53-­‐54).	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from	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  apprenticeship	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  15).	  
and	  began	  to	  promote	  national	  apprenticeship	  contracts	  under	  the	  Monti-­‐Government.	  German	  dual	  model	  was	  regarded	  as	  successful	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  52).	  In	  2012,	  dual	  apprenticeship	  program	  with	  Germany,	  which	  allowed	  Italian	  youngsters	  to	  find	  apprenticeships	  in	  Germany	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  53).	  Furthermore	  fact-­‐findings	  missions	  to	  Germany,	  which	  found	  that	  Italy	  lacked	  especially	  a	  national	  certification	  system	  and	  a	  coordination	  of	  the	  regions	  and	  municipalities	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  53).	  
InnIT2:	  Reform	  of	  unemployment	  benefits;	  In	  the	  years	  2000-­‐2012	  the	  benefits	  for	  unemployed	  were	  extended	  continuously,	  in	  Italy.	  Consequently,	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  LMPs	  was	  on	  passive	  elements	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  
After	  2011,	  the	  external	  pressure	  on	  Italy	  increased	  considerably,	  since	  the	  Troika	  demanded	  consolidation	  policies	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  34-­‐35).	  	  In	  2009,	  when	  the	  first	  regional	  governments	  wanted	  
	   Coordination	  of	  municipalities	  and	  regions	  is	  lacking,	  which	  was	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  others’	  best	  practices	  and	  effectively	  hampered	  learning	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  56).	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2015:	  33-­‐34).	  	  After	  the	  2009,	  the	  benefits	  were	  increased,	  but	  some	  elements	  of	  conditionality	  and	  ALMPs	  were	  added,	  in	  the	  beginning	  this	  was	  however	  mostly	  experimentally	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  34).	  	  For	  example	  the	  2012	  reform	  extended	  eligibility	  to	  more	  groups,	  but	  eligibility	  control	  became	  much	  tighter	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  35)	  
to	  use	  ESF	  money,	  the	  policies	  had	  to	  shift	  towards	  more	  ALMPs.	  Since	  the	  demand	  for	  financing	  increased	  in	  2012,	  the	  national	  government	  demanded	  negotiations	  with	  the	  ESF	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  36).	  	  Usually,	  policymaking	  in	  Italy	  driven	  by	  problem	  pressure	  rather	  than	  policy	  learning.	  Different	  in	  2009,	  since	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  creative	  solutions,	  as	  the	  report	  argues;	  Since	  ALMPs	  were	  necessary	  to	  get	  the	  ESF	  money,	  regional	  offices	  were	  allowed	  to	  “experiment”	  -­‐>	  but	  not	  many	  did	  in	  the	  end	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  55-­‐56).	  	  Learning	  from	  the	  Hartz-­‐reform	  in	  Germany	  to	  adapt	  the	  second	  pillar	  of	  unemployment	  protection	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  56).	  
Learning	  from	  Germany	  occurred	  to	  some	  extent,	  but	  the	  social	  partners	  vetoed	  the	  modification	  of	  short-­‐term	  work	  and	  a	  reform	  of	  social	  assistance	  schemes	  were	  not	  put	  into	  the	  reform	  package.	  
InnIT3:	  Reform	  of	   ESF	  money	  started	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the	  public	  employment	  services;	  In	  Italy,	  placement	  services	  had	  been	  in	  public	  hands	  and	  was	  gradually	  privatized	  during	  the	  1990s.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  were	  partly	  EU	  rules	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  26).	  Main	  Problem:	  lack	  of	  coordination	  between	  regional	  and	  municipal	  agencies.	  Only	  in	  2015,	  the	  national	  government	  created	  a	  National	  Agency	  for	  Active	  Labor	  Market	  Policies	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  27).	  Training	  is	  usually	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  regions	  and	  financed	  by	  ESF	  money	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  30).	  
the	  implementation	  of	  ALMPs	  in	  Italy	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  58).	  Europeanization	  (ALMPs)	  and	  use	  of	  European	  money	  for	  Italian	  policies	  (cost-­‐shifting)	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  58).	  	  OECD	  has	  criticized	  that	  Italian	  PES	  are	  ill	  equipped	  for	  systematic	  training;	  in	  Germany	  public	  agencies	  are	  much	  better	  staffed	  than	  in	  Italy	  for	  example	  (Sergi	  et	  al.	  2015:	  58).	  
Common:	   	   	   	  
NL	   InnNL1:	  Participation	  law	  2013;	  Integration	  of	  three	  existing	  laws:	  social	  assistance,	  sheltered	  employment	  act	  for	  disabled	  workers,	  benefits	  for	  unemployed	  who	  have	  became	  disabled	  before	  they	  turned	  18.	  The	  new	  
Research	  reports	  have	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  putting	  the	  issue	  on	  the	  agenda,	  i.e.	  the	  deVries	  report	  (2008)	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  9).	  	  2009-­‐2012:	  Nationwide	  experiments	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  
	   In	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  parties	  and	  stakeholders	  were	  divided:	  Christian	  democrats	  and	  liberals	  as	  well	  as	  the	  municipalities	  supported	  the	  deVries	  report.	  The	  social-­‐democrats	  and	  the	  unions	  opposed	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law	  tires	  to	  provide	  services	  to	  these	  people	  and	  reintegrate	  them	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  and	  support	  employers	  financially	  in	  hiring	  these	  people.	  What	  is	  more,	  municipalities	  will	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  implementation	  –	  and	  also	  financing	  of	  these	  measures	  -­‐>	  avenue	  for	  cost-­‐shifting	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  7).	  
2015:	  10).	  	  Learning	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  this	  reform	  in	  the	  following	  ways.	  However,	  the	  most	  important	  questions	  were	  budgetary	  issues.	  1.	  The	  proposal	  was	  based	  on	  statistical	  information,	  which	  was	  important	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  36).	  2.	  Academic	  research	  reports	  played	  an	  important	  role	  for	  agenda	  setting	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  37).	  3.	  Experiments	  were	  done.	  However,	  their	  policy	  impact	  was	  rather	  modest,	  since	  recommendations	  were	  not	  very	  specific.	  However,	  the	  experiments	  had	  some	  impact	  and	  provided	  useful	  evidences	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  measures	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  38).	  4.	  Policy	  experts	  were	  heard	  in	  the	  formualation	  process,	  but	  their	  information	  was	  not	  considered	  important.	  5.	  
the	  plans,	  especially	  because	  they	  did	  not	  trust	  the	  capacities	  of	  the	  cities	  to	  implement	  the	  program	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  10).	  	  The	  post-­‐experiment	  decision-­‐making	  process	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  anti	  crisis	  policies.	  New,	  Social	  Democratic	  government,	  which	  eventually	  agreed	  with	  the	  proposal	  although	  the	  party	  had	  opposed	  it	  before	  the	  crisis.	  The	  municipalities	  were	  kicked	  out	  of	  the	  process,	  although	  they	  had	  participated	  before.	  In	  the	  end,	  there	  was	  a	  compromise	  between	  the	  two	  biggest	  parties	  necessary,	  since	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  had	  no	  majority	  in	  the	  Senate.	  Cost-­‐containment	  played	  a	  more	  important	  role	  than	  quality	  of	  services	  due	  to	  the	  crisis	  context.	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  11).	  
47	  	  
International	  learning	  was	  not	  so	  important,	  especially	  the	  EU	  channels	  did	  not	  play	  a	  role	  contrary	  to	  US	  experiences.	  Germany	  and	  Belgium	  were	  mentioned	  as	  sources	  of	  inspiration,	  and	  Scandinavian	  countries	  as	  examples	  for	  decentralization	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  37-­‐39).	  	  
InnNL2:	  Increase	  of	  retirement	  age	  from	  65	  to	  67;	  the	  reform	  passed	  in	  2015	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17).	  
Pressure	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  OECD	  to	  reform	  faster	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Bakker	  Commission	  that	  underlined	  again	  in	  2008	  that	  the	  demographic	  pressure	  on	  the	  pension	  system	  would	  increase	  even	  further.	  	  The	  2008	  crisis	  and	  the	  necessity	  to	  consolidate	  the	  public	  budget	  opened	  the	  window	  of	  opportunity	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  39-­‐40).	  
Pension	  reforms	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  is	  a	  highly	  salient	  issue	  and	  public	  opinion	  fiercely	  opposed	  changing	  the	  existing	  system	  that	  granted	  every	  citizen	  at	  least	  70%	  of	  the	  minimum	  wage	  as	  of	  65.	  In	  the	  1994,	  the	  Christian	  democrats	  severely	  lost	  in	  elections	  when	  announcing	  to	  raise	  retirement	  age	  and	  in	  2006,	  the	  social	  democrats	  suffered	  significantly	  in	  the	  polls	  after	  bringing	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  agenda	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  39-­‐40).	  
2008	  crisis	  was	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  and	  public	  resistance	  against	  increasing	  the	  retirement	  age	  reduced	  and	  warning	  by	  scientist	  were	  heard.	  The	  conservative	  government	  failed	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus	  with	  the	  social	  partners.	  Only	  the	  Rutte	  I	  and	  Rutte	  governments	  succeeded	  to	  bring	  a	  bill	  to	  the	  parliament	  in	  2013,	  which	  passed	  and	  increased	  retirement	  age	  to	  67	  as	  of	  2025.	  In	  2015	  another	  reform	  was	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added,	  which	  linked	  the	  retirement	  age	  to	  average	  life	  expectancy	  and	  increased	  entitlement	  age	  faster	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17).	  	  	  Consensus	  between	  the	  parties	  that	  a	  reform	  is	  necessary;	  problem	  was	  public	  opposition	  and	  opposition	  by	  trade	  unions).	  
InnNL3:	  Work	  and	  Security	  Act,	  2014:	  The	  act	  changes	  the	  dismissal	  of	  workers	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  flex	  work;	  it	  broadens	  the	  access	  to	  Older	  Unemployment	  Income	  Scheme	  Act,	  but	  narrows	  the	  access	  to	  the	  Older	  and	  Partially	  Disabled	  Workers	  Unemployment	  Income	  Scheme	  Act	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  20).	  
Little	  learning	  in	  this	  innovation:	  Rather	  powering	  than	  puzzling,	  because	  the	  project	  was	  subject	  to	  considerable	  negotiations	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  40).	  	  Informal	  networks	  were	  very	  important.	  Scientific	  experts	  were	  consulted	  only	  informally.	  Due	  to	  the	  short	  time	  period	  for	  the	  project,	  there	  was	  no	  time	  for	  extensive	  pilot	  projects	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  41).	  	  Use	  of	  some	  statistical	  data;	  the	  Bakker	  commission	  was	  mentioned	  as	  
	   The	  reform	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  political	  negotiations	  between	  political	  parties	  and	  the	  social	  partners	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  21-­‐22).Generally,	  there	  was	  a	  consensus	  regarding	  most	  of	  the	  contents.	  Only	  the	  employers	  preferred	  a	  less	  complex	  dismissal	  law	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  23).	  	  The	  measure	  entailed	  significant	  budget	  cuts	  (1.2	  Bill),	  but	  the	  context	  of	  the	  crisis	  legitimized	  these	  measures	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  23).	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being	  important	  several	  times.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  EU,	  was	  rather	  minor.	  The	  Missoc	  database	  was	  used	  to	  compare	  the	  Dutch	  unemployment	  benefits	  to	  those	  of	  other	  European	  countries	  and	  to	  find	  out	  that	  the	  Dutch	  system	  was	  rather	  generous	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  41).	  
Common:	   Overall,	  the	  authors	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  little	  policy	  learning,	  mostly	  so	  in	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  retirement	  age,	  where	  there	  was	  a	  large	  consensus	  amongst	  stakeholders	  and	  parties	  as	  well	  as	  convincing	  evidence.	  More	  generally,	  politicians	  tend	  to	  accept	  the	  insights	  of	  scientific	  evidence	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  42).	  	  Trial	  and	  error	  as	  well	  as	  statistical	  information	  are	  more	  important	  than	  complex	  experiments,	  since	  there	  is	  less	  cost	  attached	  to	  the	  
	   Political	  negotiations	  are	  important;	  what	  is	  more,	  policymakers	  often	  wait	  for	  the	  right	  moment	  to	  implement	  an	  idea	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  42),	  when	  it	  fits	  their	  personal	  agenda.	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former	  (Aa	  et	  al.	  2015:	  43).	  
SLO	   InnSLO1:	  Pension	  reforms	  in	  2010	  and	  2013.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  reduce	  public	  employment	  and	  get	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible	  off	  the	  public	  sector	  (Josipovič	  and	  Šumi	  2015:	  6).	  
-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	  
InnSLO2:	  Labor	  Market	  Regulation	  Act;	  no	  clear	  information	  available	  regarding	  timing	  and	  sequences	  (Josipovič	  and	  Šumi	  2015:	  9-­‐11).	  
-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	  
InnSLO3:	  Act	  to	  prevent	  undeclared	  work;	  there	  were	  several	  reforms,	  2010,	  2011,	  2013	  and	  2014.	  The	  reform	  in	  2014	  exempted	  some	  forms	  of	  work	  from	  declaration,	  but	  the	  report	  is	  not	  very	  specific	  about	  it	  (Josipovič	  and	  Šumi	  2015:	  13).	  
-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	  
Common:	  Active	   	   	   Apparently	  all	  the	  reforms	  were	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  demands	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  associated	  demands	  for	  fiscal	  coordination;	  report	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seems	  to	  be	  critical	  about	  this,	  but	  does	  not	  explain	  any	  further	  (Josipovič	  and	  Šumi	  2015:	  18).	  
SP	   InnSP1:	  Active	  Insertion	  Income;	  Created	  as	  of	  2000	  based	  on	  temporal	  decrees;	  full	  establishment	  in	  2006	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  12).	  
Followed	  the	  suggestion	  of	  the	  EU,	  notably	  the	  European	  Commission.	  At	  the	  time	  (2000-­‐2006),	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  policy	  was	  to	  include	  vulnerable	  groups	  in	  the	  labor	  market;	  however,	  this	  changed	  during	  the	  crisis.	  Then	  the	  instrument	  became	  a	  tool	  to	  include	  everybody,	  during	  the	  crisis-­‐	  respectively	  the	  numbers	  of	  applications	  -­‐>	  2012	  Reform,	  Tightening	  of	  conditions	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  13)	  
	   Not	  very	  politicized;	  no	  party	  differences	  regarding	  the	  reform	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  13).	  Yet,	  there	  was	  opposition	  of	  business	  organizations	  to	  the	  reform	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  15).	  
InnSP2:	  Temporary	  assistance	  scheme	  for	  unemployment	  to	  support	  reinsertion	  in	  the	  job	  market.	  Services	  contained	  income	  for	  those	  who	  have	  no	  more	  claims	  on	  regular	  unemployment	  benefits	  (created	  2011)	  (Martínez-­‐
The	  reasons	  for	  the	  reform	  were	  above	  all	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  pressures	  of	  the	  crisis	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17).	  Evaluation	  and	  adaptation	  of	  the	  program	  in	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  12).	  Yet,	  prior	  to	  
High	  unemployment	  is	  a	  salient	  issue,	  presumably,	  in	  Spain.	  
Essentially,	  both	  parties	  supported	  the	  measure.	  The	  socialist	  government	  created	  though	  the	  policy	  and	  the	  Rajoy	  government	  did	  not	  abolish	  it	  in	  2012,	  yet	  there	  were	  some	  discussions	  with	  the	  unions	  about	  the	  program	  (Martínez-­‐
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Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  16);	  Reform	  in	  2012,	  adaptation	  after	  the	  evaluation	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17-­‐18).	  
introducing	  the	  instrument,	  a	  pilot	  had	  failed	  and	  the	  policy	  was	  created	  according	  to	  known	  practices	  rather	  than	  successful	  experimentation	  (no	  learning),	  as	  some	  of	  the	  interview	  partners	  reported.	  Evaluations	  of	  the	  policy	  showed	  that	  only	  18%	  of	  recipients	  found	  jobs	  for	  more	  than	  two	  months	  after	  finishing	  the	  program	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  49-­‐50).	  
Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17).	  The	  conservative	  government	  adapted	  the	  program	  according	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  prior	  government	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  17-­‐18).	  
InnSP3:	  Strategy	  of	  encouraging	  Entrepreneurship	  and	  self-­‐employment	  (2013-­‐2016);	  goal	  encourage	  employment	  and	  self-­‐entrepreneurship	  of	  young	  people.	  Tax-­‐relief	  for	  young	  unemployed;	  making	  self-­‐employment	  compatible	  with	  unemployment	  benefits	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  20).	  
Main	  problem	  pressure:	  large	  number	  of	  unemployed	  young	  people;	  large	  increase	  during	  the	  crisis	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  21).	  Ideas	  come	  from	  the	  EU	  strategies	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  21);	  Strong	  EU	  influence,	  i.e.	  the	  following	  instruments:	  The	  Strategy	  2020,	  EU	  Youth	  Strategy	  2010-­‐2018,	  European	  Youth	  Guarantee	  Initiative	  and	  the	  
Very	  salient	  issue	   Policy	  was	  formulated	  and	  passed	  by	  the	  conservative	  party;	  no	  significant	  opposition	  by	  other	  parties	  -­‐>	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  after	  a	  possible	  change	  in	  government	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  22).	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Flagship	  initiative	  Youth	  on	  the	  Move	  and	  Opportunities	  for	  Youth	  Initiative	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  43);	  Policy	  based	  on	  quantitative	  evaluations	  by	  national	  and	  European	  statistics;	  civil	  servants	  complain	  that	  their	  experience	  is	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  and	  Germany	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  model.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  report	  says	  that	  interview	  partners	  underlined	  that	  learning	  from	  others	  is	  difficult,	  due	  to	  unique	  national	  characteristics	  (Martínez-­‐Molina	  et	  al.	  2015:	  44).	  
Common:	   	   	   	  
SWE	   InnSWE1:	  Complete	  reform	  of	  the	  Swedish	  secondary	  education	  system,	  including	  new	  curriculum,	  education	  goals	  and	  grading	  scales.	  One	  prominent	  and	  important	  element	  was	  the	  idea	  to	  strengthen	  the	  
The	  media	  presented	  the	  experiences	  in	  other	  countries,	  for	  example	  in	  Switzerland	  and	  Germany,	  as	  well	  as	  Denmark.	  The	  solution	  they	  suggested	  entailed	  better	  coordination	  between	  employers	  and	  the	  state	  to	  have	  
	   The	  right	  wing	  party	  had	  made	  the	  issue	  part	  of	  its	  electoral	  campaign	  in	  2006	  (WHY??)	  and	  set	  up	  a	  committee	  to	  propose	  a	  new	  structure	  for	  secondary	  education	  in	  2007;	  the	  political	  process	  comprised	  of	  an	  inclusion	  of	  target	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apprenticeship	  program	  and	  create	  tighter	  connections	  between	  firms	  and	  the	  school	  system;	  the	  bill	  passed	  parliament	  in	  2008	  and	  the	  reform	  was	  introduced	  in	  2011	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  26-­‐27).	  
apprenticeship	  programs	  that	  correspond	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  labor	  market	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  48-­‐49).	  	  Apprenticeships	  programs	  were	  introduced	  as	  trials	  in	  2008.	  There	  had	  been	  attempts	  before	  to	  strengthen	  education	  on	  the	  private	  market,	  but	  there	  problems,	  such	  as	  the	  financial	  compensation	  for	  employers	  for	  example	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  49-­‐50).	  
groups	  in	  policy	  formulation	  (trade	  organizations,	  social	  partners,	  school	  unions	  and	  student	  organizations)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  public	  hearing	  of	  the	  legislative	  draft.	  The	  apprenticeship	  program	  was	  most	  debated,	  especially	  the	  delegation	  of	  training	  competences	  to	  firms.	  The	  bureaucracy	  opposed	  these	  reforms,	  but	  the	  government	  insisted	  and	  the	  apprenticeship	  was	  set	  up	  (SWE-­‐Rep,	  27-­‐28).	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  27-­‐28).	  	  A	  problem	  regarding	  policy	  implementation	  of	  these	  program	  was	  that	  there	  was	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  students	  who	  were	  really	  interested	  in	  these	  programs	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  30).	  
InnSWE2:	  Activity	  compensation	  for	  disabled	  youth;	  cash	  benefits;	  introduced	  
Key	  problems	  pressure	  for	  the	  2007	  reform:	  increasing	  applications	  for	  the	  
	   The	  left	  government	  introduced	  the	  2003	  program;	  in	  2007	  the	  right-­‐wing	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2003;	  the	  reform	  shifted	  the	  eligibility	  from	  19-­‐30	  years;	  revised	  in	  2007;	  conditionality:	  the	  benefits	  were	  related	  to	  some	  paid	  work	  and	  assessment	  conditions	  became	  stricter	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  33-­‐34).	  
benefit,	  but	  no	  increase	  in	  placement	  on	  the	  labor	  market	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  38).	  	  As	  of	  2008,	  monitoring	  was	  established	  for	  the	  program	  a	  number	  of	  reports	  were	  published.	  In	  2011,	  an	  evaluation	  showed	  that	  since	  1995,	  application	  doubled,	  but	  the	  placement	  towards	  regular	  employment	  remained	  as	  low	  as	  ever	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  51).	  	  As	  of	  2008,	  trials	  with	  private	  actors	  to	  assess	  their	  placement	  rates	  compared	  to	  public	  actors,	  however	  private	  providers	  did	  not	  come	  up	  with	  better	  results	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  51-­‐52).	  	  Another	  pilot	  assessed	  better	  instruments	  for	  returning	  to	  work	  and	  improving	  work	  capability.	  After	  
government	  reformed	  the	  program	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  34).	  	  The	  2007	  reform	  was	  subject	  to	  a	  public	  consultation,	  as	  any	  legislative	  reform	  proposal.	  Overall,	  the	  reform	  received	  a	  lot	  of	  support,	  as	  it	  aimed	  at	  activating	  disabled	  youth	  better	  for	  the	  labor	  market;	  the	  only	  conflict	  point	  was	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  public	  agency	  (SIA)	  in	  the	  implementation	  process	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  35).	  	  Differences	  between	  municipalities	  in	  the	  implementation	  due	  to	  different	  financial	  constraints	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  37).	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assessment,	  the	  program	  became	  a	  national	  policy	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  52).	  	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  SIA	  used	  some	  methods	  that	  were	  developed	  abroad,	  i.e.	  in	  the	  U.S.	  to	  improve	  the	  implementation	  of	  Activity	  compensation.	  Municipalities	  and	  regions	  can	  apply	  for	  these	  funds	  to	  improve	  their	  implementation	  of	  these	  policies	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  51-­‐52).	  
InnSWE3:	  Job	  guarantee	  for	  youth;	  Placement	  and	  training	  program	  for	  youth;	  2006;	  Main	  novelty:	  mandatory	  participation	  to	  keep	  remuneration;	  implemented	  by	  the	  national	  agency	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  39).	  
Main	  problem	  was	  rising	  youth	  unemployment	  2001-­‐2006	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  39).	  	  Ideas	  came	  from	  similar	  experiences	  in	  Denmark	  and	  GB	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  40).	  	  Evaluations	  of	  the	  program	  show	  that	  the	  programs	  are	  in	  practice	  nor	  full	  time	  programs	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  42).	  
	   National	  government	  right	  wing	  government	  passed	  the	  reform,	  but	  the	  issue	  had	  been	  on	  the	  agenda	  before.	  In	  the	  consultation	  process,	  the	  most	  contested	  point	  were	  the	  sanctions	  participants	  faced	  in	  case	  they	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  program’s	  obligation	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  40).	  Especially	  the	  Unions	  fiercely	  opposed	  this	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  Development	  of	  the	  program	  based	  on	  research	  by	  the	  right-­‐wing	  party’s	  researchers.	  But	  the	  memorandum	  for	  the	  reform	  refers	  to	  a	  government	  report	  that	  outlines	  several	  factors	  to	  improve	  youth	  employment	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  53).	  
point(McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015)	  (Minas	  and	  Andersson	  2015:	  40-­‐41).	  
Common:	   	   	   	  
UK	   InnUK1:	  Employment	  and	  support	  allowance	  (ESA);	  aims	  at	  disabled	  or	  people	  with	  long-­‐term	  health	  conditions;	  Introduced	  in	  the	  Welfare	  and	  Reform	  Act	  in	  2007	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  15).	  Tougher	  sanctions	  in	  2012	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  15).	  
Yearly	  evaluations	  (negative);	  program	  not	  regarded	  as	  very	  efficient	  and	  having	  a	  high	  placement	  rate	  compared	  to	  other	  programs	  (no	  wonder	  given	  that	  focused	  on	  handicapped)	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  16-­‐17).	  2007	  changed	  the	  definition	  of	  disability	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  67).	  Negative	  reports	  about	  performance,	  but	  no	  adaptation	  of	  the	  program	  2007	  changed	  the	  definition	  of	  disability	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  68).	  
Problem	  pressure:	  low	  performance;	  salience?	  	  
Interest	  groups	  and	  representatives	  had	  lobbied	  for	  the	  2007	  change	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  disability	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  67).	  
InnUK2:	  The	  work	   Reports	  show	  that	   Salience:	  UK	   Conservatives	  favor	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program;	  replaced	  Pathways	  to	  Work	  in	  2011,	  but	  is	  essentially	  the	  same,	  because	  it	  responded	  to	  the	  Freud-­‐Report	  of	  2007,	  which	  evaluated	  the	  old	  program,	  but	  the	  government	  claimed	  it	  to	  be	  all	  new	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  27).	  2011	  increase	  of	  sanctions	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  33).	  
sanctions	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  saving,	  but	  negative	  effects	  on	  job-­‐finding.	  Work	  program	  performed	  poorly	  in	  the	  beginning;	  starter	  without	  pilot	  nationwide	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  33).	  	  
electorate	  supportive	  of	  higher	  sanctions	  towards	  unemployment	  benefit	  receivers	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  32).	  
higher	  sanctions,	  however,	  the	  topic	  had	  not	  been	  part	  of	  the	  New	  Labor	  Program	  prior	  to	  2010	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  33).	  
InnUK3:	  National	  Minimum	  Wage;	  introduced	  1998	  by	  Labor	  after	  promised	  in	  the	  election;	  entered	  the	  political	  agenda	  during	  the	  1980s;	  both	  main	  parties	  were	  opposed	  to	  it	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  as	  they	  were	  afraid	  of	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  economy	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  32-­‐33).	  Freeze	  of	  minimum	  wage	  for	  the	  young,	  in	  2012	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  32).	  
1992-­‐1997,	  the	  perception	  of	  minimum	  wage	  changed,	  due	  to	  positive	  evaluations	  of	  the	  American	  minimum	  wage	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  34).	  No	  UK	  evidence	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  35).	  Later	  evaluations	  of	  the	  UK	  program	  did	  not	  find	  any	  negative	  effect	  of	  the	  law	  on	  employment	  practices	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  36).	  No	  positive	  effect	  expected	  concerning	  the	  freeze	  for	  young	  people	  should	  have	  on	  their	  employment	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  39)	  
Salient;	  labor	  won	  the	  election	  with	  this	  topic	  in	  1997;	  when	  it	  promised	  to	  introduce	  a	  commission	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  issue	  rather	  than	  promising	  an	  actual	  rater	  of	  minimum	  wage	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  34).	  Conservative	  government	  supported	  freeze	  for	  youth	  MW,	  in	  2012.	  Not	  clear	  on	  which	  evidence	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  38).	  
Politicized	  in	  1997,	  conservative	  government	  did	  not	  support	  the	  idea,	  although	  business	  did	  so.	  This	  was	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  labor	  lost	  the	  election	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  74).	  
	   Common	  elements	   Central	  government	   	   Public	  opinion	  is	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as	  initiator;	  independent	  think	  tanks	  play	  a	  role	  in	  deploying	  policy	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  40);	  LPC	  (Commission	  for	  Minimum	  Wage)	  is	  an	  important	  element	  of	  policy	  learning	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  75).	  
against	  the	  significant	  spending	  for	  unemployment	  insurance	  etc.	  Individual	  is	  responsible	  for	  finding	  a	  job.	  Consequently,	  there	  all	  three	  main	  parties	  have	  tended	  to	  support	  more	  restrictive	  unemployment	  policies	  (McEnhill	  et	  al.	  2015:	  48).	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